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This study was requested by the City of Kodiak to analyze how crab rationalization has 
affected crab fishing jobs and earnings of Kodiak residents and sales of Kodiak 
businesses.  The study is limited to these issues.  It does not address many other 
important issues raised by crab rationalization. 
 
There are significant challenges in studying economic effects of crab rationalization on 
Kodiak.  There are important differences between crab fisheries, and within each fishery 
there are differences in boat sizes, vessel ownership, quota allocation, and many other 
factors which affect how quota is fished.   Many factors besides rationalization affect 
crab fisheries, and many factors besides crab fisheries affect Kodiak’s economy—making 
it difficult to identify the specific effects of crab rationalization on Kodiak 
 
General Economic Effects of Crab Rationalization 
 
Rationalization began very recently.  It is far too early to know what the long-term effects 
of crab rationalization will be on how many boats fish, on crab fishing jobs and earnings, 
on quota lease rates, on crab markets and prices, and on communities.    
 
Since rationalization began in the 2005/06 season, there have been very rapid and 
dramatic changes in the crab fisheries.  Between the 2004/05 and 2005/06 seasons, vessel 
registration declined by about two-thirds for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab (BBR) 
fishery and by about one-half for the Bering Sea Snow Crab (BSS) fishery.1 
 
Type of measure Measure 2005 2005/06 Change % Change
Harvest (000 pounds) 14,112 16,467 2,355 17%
Assumed ex-vessel price ($/lb) $4.71 $4.30 -$0.41 -9%
Estimated ex-vessel value ($ million) $65.7 $70.5 $4.8 7%
Number of pots pulled 90,972 103,337 12,365 14%
Number of landings 270 263 -7 -3%
Average pots registered per vessel 197 177 -21 -10%
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 23 24 1 4%
Number of vessels registered 251 89 -162 -65%
Number of pots registered 49,506 15,713 -33,793 -68%
Average pots pulled per vessel 362 1,161 799 220%
Estimated avg. days fished per vessel 3 26 23 767%
Average landings per vessel 1.1 3.0 1.9 175%
Average harvest per vessel (pounds) 56,225 185,024 128,799 229%
Average ex-vessel value per vessel ($) $261,806 $791,858 $530,052 202%
Changes in the Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery Between the 2005 and 2005/06 Seasons
Average effort, 
harvest and value 
per vessel








There has been a corresponding dramatic decline in the number of crab fishing jobs, with 
a decline of about 900 BBR jobs and about 450 BSS jobs.  Not all of the decline in vessel 
participation and jobs is due specifically to crab rationalization.  About 15% of the 
2005/06 decline for the BBR fishery was due to the crab vessel buyback program.    
                                                 
1 Throughout this report I refer to the Bering Sea Opilio Crab fishery as the “Bering Sea Snow Crab” 
fishery, following ADFG practice. 
The remaining crab fishing jobs are a different kind of job, generally with longer seasons, 
more total income (for those working), lower earnings per day fishing (but not 
necessarily per day worked), more certainty about income (for those working), and a 
decline in the share of fishing income in total ex-vessel value.  
 
Rationalization has cut into sales of businesses which sell to crab boats and crab 
fishermen—particularly those businesses whose sales depend on the number of boats and 
people fishing. 
 
Economic Effects of Crab Rationalization on Kodiak 
 
Not enough information is presently available to measure economic effects of crab 
rationalization on Kodiak with any great degree of precision. 
 
Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, the number of Kodiak boats which fished for Bristol Bay 
Red King Crab fell from about 54 to about 23, or by about 57%. 
 
Kodiak residents probably lost between 100 and 180 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishing 
jobs and between 60 and 105 Bering Sea Snow Crab fishing jobs due to rationalization.   
 
Rationalization probably reduced the total earnings of Kodiak residents working in the 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery by between $1.0 million and $1.6 million. 
 
Rationalization has cut into the sales of some Kodiak businesses which supply and 
service the crab fleet—but there has been no obvious major decline for marine supply and 
service companies since rationalization began. 
 
Total sales of Kodiak businesses declined slightly in the fourth quarter of 2005 and the 
first quarter of 2006, compared to the corresponding quarters of the previous year—but it 
is unclear to what extent this was caused by crab rationalization or other factors. 
  
Kodiak is a relatively large and diversified community that depends on many fisheries 
and other activities.  This tends to dampen the relative economic effects of crab 








The number of vessels 
participating in the 
Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab fishery declined 
dramatically during the 





A “best guess” estimate 
is that in 2005/06 Kodiak 
residents lost 106 Bristol 
Bay Red King Crab 
fishing jobs and 59 
Bering Sea Snow Crab 
fishing jobs due to 
rationalization.  Upper-
bound estimates would be 
that Kodiak residents lost 
179 Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab fishing jobs 
and 105 Bering Sea Snow 
Crab fishing jobs.   
 
 
Estimates based on a 
model of costs and 
payments for a 
hypothetical fishing 
vessel suggest that as 
crab vessel leases more 
quota, the share of ex-
vessel value paid for 
quota royalties increases 
while the shares paid to 
vessel owners and crew 
decline. 
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Estimated Distribution of Total Vessel Revenues for Different Levels of Quota Leasing:
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fall of 2005, significant changes were implemented in the management of Bering 
Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fisheries.  These changes are referred to as “Crab 
Rationalization.”2  According to the National Marine Fisheries Service: 
 
The Crab Rationalization Program allocates BSAI crab resources among 
harvesters, processors, and coastal communities. The North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council developed the Program over a 6-year period 
to accommodate the specific dynamics and needs of the BSAI crab 
fisheries. . . Program components include: quota share allocation, 
processor quota share allocation, IFQ and individual processing quota 
(IPQ) issuance, quota transfers, use caps, crab harvesting cooperatives, 
protections for Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries, arbitration system, 
monitoring, economic data collection, and cost recovery fee collection. 
 
With the implementation of crab rationalization, major changes occurred in BSAI crab 
fisheries during the 2005-06 season, including a dramatic consolidation in the number of 
vessels participating in BSAI crab fisheries. 
 
The changes in the crab fisheries during the first season of crab rationalization raised 
concerns in many coastal Alaska communities, including Kodiak.  Among these concerns 
were losses in crab fishing jobs, changes in compensation for crab fishing captains and 
crew, and effects on businesses selling services and supplies to vessels and fishermen.  
The early experience with crab rationalization also raised concerns about the potential 
implications of proposals for rationalization of Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries.3   
 
Origins of this Study 
 
In order to get a better understanding of how Kodiak had been affected by crab 
rationalization, in December 2005 the City of Kodiak invited the Institute of Social and 
Economic Research (ISER) to prepare a study addressing these three questions:  
 
• How has BSAI crab rationalization affected employment of Kodiak residents as 
skippers and crew in BSAI crab fisheries? 
 
• How has BSAI crab rationalization affected compensation paid to Kodiak 
residents participating as captains and crew in BSAI crab fisheries? 
 
• How has BSAI crab rationalization affected Kodiak businesses? 
 
                                                 
2 Detailed information about crab rationalization may be found at the “Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands 
(BSAI) Crab Rationalization Program” website of the National Marine Fisheries Service Alaska Regional 
Office, at: http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/crfaq.htm#CRreports. 
3 Not all Kodiak residents share these concerns.  As with any fisheries policy issue, Kodiak residents have 
widely varying perceptions of and attitudes towards crab rationalization. 
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In response to this invitation, I prepared a proposal for a study addressing these questions.  
In the proposal, I recommended that the study be divided into two phases: 
 
Phase I:  Preliminary Analysis.  This phase of the project will address 
the research questions as best possible based on existing studies and data, 
and a relatively small number of interviews (put differently, without 
conducting large numbers of interviews and/or surveys.)  Phase I will 
focus on the King Crab fishery. 
   
Phase II:  Interviews and Surveys; Opilio Season Analysis.  This phase 
of the project will extend the preliminary analysis by conducting 
additional interviews and/or surveys to obtain more reliable and more 
detailed information.  Phase II will also include analysis of the Opilio 
fishery. 
 
I noted that the proposal was for Phase I of the study, and suggested that I should 
“prepare a proposal for Phase II of the research at a later date, after considering what 
kinds of interviews and/or surveys would be most useful and cost-effective for obtaining 
additional information about the research questions.” 
 
The City of Kodiak accepted the proposal and I began work on this project in January 
2006.  This document is the report for Phase I of this project (Preliminary Analysis).4  In 
the final chapter, I describe options for further analysis. 
 
My Background and Objectives in Undertaking this Study 
 
As a Professor of Economics at the University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social 
and Economic Research (ISER), I have been actively involved in research and teaching 
about the Alaska economy and Alaska resource management and markets for the past 
twenty-five years.5  For the past fifteen years, most of my research has focused on the 
Alaska seafood industry, including seafood markets, fisheries management, and the role 
of the seafood industry in the Alaska economy.  I have worked primarily on issues related 
to the salmon industry, but I have also studied markets for and management issues related 
to the halibut, herring, and pollock fisheries. 
 
Until this study, I had done relatively little work related to Alaska crab fisheries.  I was 
not involved in any way with the development of the crab rationalization program.  I did 
not advocate for or against the program or any elements of the program. 
 
I undertook this study because I was asked to by the City of Kodiak and because it 
addresses issues of importance to Alaska.  My goal in this study has been to develop the 
best possible objective answers to the three questions the City of Kodiak asked me to 
                                                 
4 Preliminary ADFG data for the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery became available in early May.  As a result, 
I was able to include some analysis of the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery in this preliminary analysis. 
5 My resume and copies of selected publications and presentations are available on my website:  
www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/iser/people/knapp. 
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study, given the limited available data and the limited time and resources available for the 
research. 
 
My goal in this study is not to argue for or against crab rationalization or any component 
of the crab rationalization program.  I do not offer or intend any conclusions about 
whether crab rationalization is good or bad or should or shouldn’t have been done 
differently. 
 
Questions Not Addressed by this Study 
 
This study focuses on three specific questions related to effects of crab rationalization: 
 
• How has crab rationalization affected employment of captains and crew? 
• How has crab rationalization affected compensation of captains and crew? 
• How has rationalization affected fishing support businesses? 
 
These are important questions.  But—as is clear from reading the newspapers, listening to 
public testimony, or talking about rationalization with Kodiak residents, fishermen, 
vessel owners and processors—they are by no means the only questions raised by crab 
rationalization.  Other important questions raised by crab rationalization include (but are 
not limited to): 
 
• How has rationalization affected crab markets? 
• How has rationalization affected wholesale and ex-vessel prices? 
• How has rationalization affected fishing costs? 
• How has rationalization affected processing costs? 
• How has rationalization affected economic efficiency and profitability of the crab 
fishery and processing industry? 
• How has rationalization affected income and profits of vessel owners? 
• How has rationalization affected safety of the crab fishery? 
• How has management affected costs of management and enforcement? 
• How has rationalization affected other fisheries? 
• What factors have affected the extent and speed of consolidation of the crab fleet? 
• What factors have affected quota lease rates? 
• What have been the economic effects of processor quotas? 
• What does experience with crab rationalization imply about potential effects of 
rationalization of other fisheries? 
 
In the course of this study many people talked to me at length about these other questions 
and why they are important.  I agree that they are important and should be studied.  But I 
have not studied them, because I was not asked to study them—and because studying 
them would have vastly expanded the scope of this preliminary analysis. 
 
In short, this report is not a comprehensive analysis of economic effects of crab 
rationalization on Kodiak, much less a comprehensive analysis of the effects of crab 
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rationalization.  It is, rather, a start towards examining a few of the many complex 
questions raised by crab rationalization 
An important policy question for fishery managers and the many stakeholders in Alaska 
fisheries is when, how, and by whom the many other questions raised by crab 
rationalization should be studied.   
 
Challenges in Studying Economic Effects of Crab Rationalization on Kodiak 
 
There are significant challenges in studying economic effects of crab rationalization on 
Kodiak.  These challenges have limited my ability to answer the three questions the City 
of Kodiak asked me to address for this study.  More generally, these challenges confront, 
to varying extents, any potential study of effects of crab rationalization.   
 
1.  Rationalization began very recently.  The effects of crab rationalization will 
happen over a long period of time. 
 
Crab rationalization has been in place for less than a year.  Crab rationalization is a 
learning experience for everyone involved.  The crab fisheries will most likely not stay 
the same as they were in the first year of crab rationalization.  It is far too early to know 
what the long-term effects of crab rationalization will be on how many boats fish, on crab 
fishing jobs and earnings, on quota lease rates, on crab markets and prices, and on 
communities.  It took far longer than one year to begin to understand the long-term 
economic effects of salmon limited entry, halibut and sablefish IFQs, the CDQ program, 
and the American Fisheries Act.  
 
A practical challenge is that only limited data are available for what has happened during 
the first year of rationalization, and these data have become available only recently.  I did 
not receive data for the Bering Sea Snow Crab (opilio) fishery until the middle of May.6 
 
2.  There is wide variation between and within BSAI crab fisheries. 
 
There are differences between crab fisheries. Within each crab fishery, there are 
differences in boat sizes, vessel ownership, quota allocation, and many other factors 
which affect how quota is fished. Some vessel owners own only one vessel, while others 
own multiple vessels. Some quota holders leased out their quota, some fished only their 
own quota, while others leased additional quota. Boats vary in how long they fished and 
how crew were paid. Boats also vary in the extent to which they participate in other 
fisheries. Historically, of course, there was also great variation in vessel catches and 
earnings prior to rationalization.  This variation makes it difficult to generalize about 
                                                 
6 Although the first season can’t show all the effects of crab rationalization, it is useful to study the effects 
of crab rationalization from the beginning.  It’s only by beginning to study these effects that we will begin 
to understand the challenges involved in studying them.  If we wait three years we may discover that we 
haven’t collected the information we need to answer the questions that we now wish to ask.  In addition, 
people are very interested in the effects of crab rationalization, and will discuss and debate these effects 
based on the information they have. 
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what is happening in the crab fisheries and about how boats, crew, and communities have 
been affected by rationalization 
 
3.  Many factors besides rationalization affect crab fisheries. 
 
Not all of the changes in the crab fishery in the 2005-06 season were due to 
rationalization. Nor will all future changes be due to rationalization.  Crab resource 
conditions and quotas change from year to year; world crab market conditions change 
from year to year; and fuel prices change from year to year.  It is difficult to separate the 
effects of rationalization from the effects of these other factors on the crab fishery.  This 
year’s crab fisheries—and how people perceive the effects of rationalization—would 
have been different if the total crab quota had been larger, prices had been higher, or fuel 
costs had been lower. 
 
4.  Many factors besides crab fisheries affect Kodiak’s economy. 
 
Not all of the economic changes in Kodiak this year or in future years have been or will 
be due to crab rationalization. Economic conditions in other fisheries and other industries 
change from year to year.  Federal spending and state spending change from year to year. 
Permanent fund dividends change from year to year. Old businesses close and new 
businesses open.  It is difficult to separate the effects of rationalization from the effects of 
these other factors on Kodiak’s economy. 
 
5.  The crab fisheries would have changed even without rationalization. 
 
We can’t assume that if rationalization hadn’t happened, the same number of boats would 
have continued to fish for crab, providing the same number of crab fishing jobs.  It is 
likely that some consolidation would have happened in the crab fishery without 
rationalization—as has occurred, for example, in Kodiak seine fisheries.  The true effects 
of rationalization can’t be measured by the changes we observe over time.  They are, 
rather, how the fisheries differ from what they would have become without 
rationalization—which we can’t know exactly. 
 
6.  Crab rationalization affects more fisheries than crab.   
 
Different Alaska fisheries are economically linked in many ways.  Changes in one fishery 
affect other fisheries.  For example, captains and crew may work in a lower-paying 
fishery or tendering to gain the opportunity to fish in a higher paying fishery (like crab). 
If crab fishing job opportunities decline, this may affect availability of crew for other 
fisheries.  As another example, boats and fishermen that stop fishing for crab may 
participate in other fisheries—creating more jobs in those fisheries (but probably not 
more value).  Crab boats often participate in multiple fisheries.  A change in one of these 
fisheries may affect the profitability of the entire operation.  Put simply, we can’t 




II.  OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN BSAI CRAB FISHERIES IN 2005/06 
 
There are several different BSAI crab fisheries affected by crab rationalization.  As 
shown in Table II-1, the two fisheries which account for most of the harvest volume are 
the Bristol Bay Red King Crab (BBR) fishery and the Bering Sea Snow (Opilio) Crab 
fishery (BSS).  This report focuses on these two fisheries.  It focuses particularly on the 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery, since the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery was still 
under way while I was writing this report. 
 
Table II-1 
Fishery code Fishery description Allocation (lbs)
BBR Bristol Bay red king crab 16,496,100
BSS Bering Sea snow crab 33,465,600
BST Bering Sea Bairdi Tanner crab 1,458,000
EAG Eastern Aleutian Islands golden king crab 2,700,000
WAG Western Aleutian Islands golden king crab 2,430,000
Total TOTAL 56,549,700
BSAI Crab Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Allocations
August 15 2005 - June 30 2006
Source:  NOAA Restricted Access Management Division, NMFS Crab IFQ 
Allocations and Landings Report, www.fakr.noaa.gov/ram/daily/cratland.htm.  
Data downloaded May 18, 2006.  
 
Harvest volumes have been higher in recent years for the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery, 
but ex-vessel prices and ex-vessel value have been higher for the Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab fishery (Table II-2).  The Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery opens in October while 
the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery opens in January.  Prior to and after implementation of 
rationalization, the average number of days fished has been longer for the Bering Sea 
Snow Crab fishery. 
 
Table II-2 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Harvest (million pounds) 8.9 14.5 14.1 16.5
Ex-vessel price ($ millions) $6.14 $5.08 $4.71 $4.30
Ex-vessel value ($ millions) 54.2 72.7 65.7 70.5
Opens in
Days 3 5 3 26
Harvest (million pounds) 26.3 22.2 23.0 30.8
Ex-vessel price ($/lb) $1.83 $2.05 $2.05 NA
Ex-vessel value ($ millions) 47.0 45.0 46.8 NA
Opens in
Days 9 8 5 42
January
October
Note:  2002-03 refers to the Bristol Bay Red King Crab season which began in October 2002 and the 
Bering Sea Snow Crab season which began in January 2003.  Data for the 2005-06 season are 
preliminary.  Sources are listed in Tables II-3 and II-4.
Comparison of the Two Major BSAI Crab Fisheries, 2002/03-2005/06
Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab






Tables II-3 and II-4 provide summary data for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab and the 
Bering Sea Snow Crab fisheries.  Note that all of the data for the 2005/06 are preliminary 
and subject to change, particularly data for pot lifts, days fished, ex-vessel price and ex-
vessel value.7     
 
Table II-3 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery Summary Data, 1996-2005/06
Source 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005/06
Harvest (000 pounds) A 8,406 8,756 14,233 11,091 7,546 7,786 8,857 14,530 14,112 16,467
Deadloss (000 pounds) A 24 14 54 44 76 57 32 228 161 78
Estimated live deliveries (000 pounds) * 8,381 8,743 14,179 11,047 7,470 7,729 8,825 14,302 13,952 16,390
Number of vessels registered A 196 256 274 257 246 230 242 252 251 89
Number of landings A 198 265 284 268 256 238 254 275 270 263
Number of pots registered A 39,461 27,499 56,420 42,403 26,352 24,571 25,833 46,964 49,506 15,713
Number of pots pulled A 76,433 90,510 141,707 146,997 98,694 63,242 68,328 129,019 90,972 103,337
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) A 16 15 15 12 12 19 20 18 23 24
Estimated avg. days fished per vessel A 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 5 3 26
Ex-vessel price ($/lb) B $4.01 $3.26 $2.64 $6.26 $4.81 $4.81 $6.14 $5.08 $4.71
Ex-vessel price ($/lb) C $4.00 $3.25 $2.60 $6.27 $4.80 $4.92 $6.27 $5.15 $4.70 $4.30
Assumed ex-vessel price ($/lb) * $4.01 $3.26 $2.64 $6.26 $4.81 $4.81 $6.14 $5.08 $4.71 $4.30
Estimated ex-vessel value ($ million) * $33.6 $28.5 $37.4 $69.2 $35.9 $37.2 $54.2 $72.7 $65.7 $70.5
Average pots registered per vessel * 201 107 206 165 107 107 107 186 197 177
Average pots pulled per vessel * 390 354 517 572 401 275 282 512 362 1,161
Average harvest per vessel (pounds) * 42,886 34,205 51,945 43,155 30,675 33,854 36,598 57,660 56,225 185,024
Average ex-vessel value per vessel ($) * $171,478 $111,333 $136,619 $269,078 $146,057 $161,640 $223,898 $288,310 $261,806 $791,858
Average landings per vessel * 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.0
Average live deliveries per landing * 42,331 32,991 49,927 41,219 29,179 32,475 34,743 52,007 51,674 62,318
Notes:  All 2005/06 data are preliminary and subject to change, particularly data for pot lifts, average days fished, ex-vessel price and ex-vessel 
value.  Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is defined as number of legal crabs retained per pot lift.
A.  Review of major BSAI crab fisheries, 2005/06.  Powerpoint presentation prepared by Forrest R. Bowers, ADFG, May 2006. 
B.  ADFG 2004 Shellfish Management Report, Table 2-2.
C.  ADFG Preliminary Alaska Shellfish Summaries, posted at www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfsh/shellfish_harvest.php.
* Calculated from data in table.  
 
Table II-4 
Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery Summary Data, 1997-2006
Source 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005/06
Harvest (000 pounds) A 119,543 243,341 184,530 30,775 23,382 30,253 26,342 22,170 23,036 30,840
Deadloss (000 pounds) A 2,352 2,894 1,828 338 430 583 665 224 224 299
Estimated live deliveries (000 pounds) * 117,191 240,447 182,702 30,437 22,952 29,670 25,677 21,946 22,812 30,541
Number of vessels registered A 226 229 241 229 207 191 192 189 164 80
Number of landings A 1127 1767 1630 287 293 403 230 240 196 274
Number of pots registered A 47,036 47,909 50,173 43,407 40,379 37,807 20,452 14,444 12,930 13,734
Number of pots pulled A 754,140 891,268 899,043 170,064 176,930 307,666 139,903 110,087 69,617 114,161
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) A 133 209 159 137 97 76 155 157 240 180
Estimated avg. days fished per vessel A 65 64 66 7 30 24 9 8 5 42
Ex-vessel price ($/lb) B $0.79 $0.56 $0.88 $1.81 $1.53 $1.49 $1.83 $2.05
Ex-vessel price ($/lb) C $0.75 $0.55 $0.98 $1.85 $1.55 $1.40 $1.84 $2.05 $1.80
Assumed ex-vessel price ($/lb) * $0.79 $0.56 $0.88 $1.81 $1.53 $1.49 $1.83 $2.05 $2.05 NA
Estimated ex-vessel value ($ million) * $92.6 $134.7 $160.8 $55.1 $35.1 $44.2 $47.0 $45.0 $46.8 NA
Average pots registered per vessel * 208 209 208 190 195 198 107 76 79 172
Average pots pulled per vessel * 3,337 3,892 3,730 743 855 1,611 729 582 424 1,427
Average harvest per vessel (pounds) * 528,951 1,062,626 765,684 134,388 112,957 158,390 137,198 117,302 140,465 385,495
Average ex-vessel value per vessel ($) * $409,652 $587,994 $667,126 $240,570 $169,646 $231,456 $244,732 $238,036 $285,151 NA
Average landings per vessel * 5.0 7.7 6.8 1.3 1.4 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 3.4
Average live deliveries per landing * 103,985 136,077 112,087 106,052 78,335 73,623 111,638 91,441 116,388 111,462
* Calculated from data in table.
Notes:  All 2006 data are preliminary and subject to change, particularly data for pot lifts and average days fished.  Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is 
defined as number of legal crabs retained per pot lift.  No ex-vessel price data for 2006 were available when this report was prepared.
A.  Review of major BSAI crab fisheries, 2005/06.  Powerpoint presentation prepared by Forrest R. Bowers, ADFG, May 2006. 
B.  ADFG 2004 Shellfish Management Report, Table 2-29.
C.  ADFG Preliminary Alaska Shellfish Summaries, posted at www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfsh/shellfish_harvest.php.
 
                                                 
7 Changes in the management of the BSAI crab fisheries impose a need for corresponding changes in the 
collection, analysis, and reporting of data for these fisheries, requiring extra time and work for ADFG in 
this first season.  I appreciate the assistance of ADFG in providing these preliminary data in order to make 
this analysis possible. 
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Table II-5 provides an overview of changes in the Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery 
between the 2004 season and the 2005/06 season.  I have divided Table II-5 into four 
types of measures of the fishery. 
 
Table II-5 
Type of measure Measure 2004 2005/06 Change % Change
Harvest (000 pounds) 14,112 16,467 2,355 17%
Assumed ex-vessel price ($/lb) $4.71 $4.30 -$0.41 -9%
Estimated ex-vessel value ($ million) $65.7 $70.5 $4.8 7%
Number of pots pulled 90,972 103,337 12,365 14%
Number of landings 270 263 -7 -3%
Average pots registered per vessel 197 177 -21 -10%
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 23 24 1 4%
Number of vessels registered 251 89 -162 -65%
Number of pots registered 49,506 15,713 -33,793 -68%
Average pots pulled per vessel 362 1,161 799 220%
Estimated avg. days fished per vessel 3 26 23 767%
Average landings per vessel 1.1 3.0 1.9 175%
Average harvest per vessel (pounds) 56,225 185,024 128,799 229%
Average ex-vessel value per vessel ($) $261,806 $791,858 $530,052 202%
Changes in the Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery Between the 2004 and 2005/06 Seasons
Average effort, 
harvest and value 
per vessel








There was relatively little change in total catch, value and effort in the fishery.  The total 
harvest was up 17% and the total ex-vessel value was up 7%.  The total number of pots 
pulled was up 14% and the total number of landings (vessel deliveries to processors) was 
down 3%.  By themselves these measures do not reveal major changes in the fishery. 
 
Similarly, there was relatively little change in how vessels and pots were used in fishing.  
The average number of pots registered per vessel was 10% lower, and the catch per unit 
of effort (number of legal crabs per pot lift) was 4% higher.  By themselves these 
measures also do not reveal major changes in the fishery. 
 
However, there were dramatic changes in vessel participation.  The number of vessels 
registered for the fishery fell from 251 to 89—or by almost two-thirds (65%).  
Correspondingly, the number of pots registered fell by more than two-thirds (68%). 
 
With the decline in vessel participation there was a dramatic increase in average effort, 
harvest, and ex-vessel value per vessel.  The average number of pots pulled per vessel 
more than tripled from 362 to 1161.  The average landings per vessel almost tripled from 
1.1 to 3.0.  The average harvest per vessel more than tripled from 56 thousand pounds to 
185 thousand pounds.  The average ex-vessel value per vessel more than tripled from 
$262 thousand to $792 thousand. 
 
These changes are summarized in Figures II-1 through II-8 on the following page.  They 
clearly show a dramatic consolidation in the number of vessels participating in the Bering 
Sea Red King Crab fishery—with a corresponding dramatic increase in average catches 
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Figure II-2 
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Figure II-3 
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Figure II-4 















Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery, 2002-2005:
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Figure II-6 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery, 2002-2005:
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Figure II-7 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery, 2002-2005:
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Figure II-8 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery, 2002-2005:
Average Days Fished per Vessel

















Almost all of the 2005 
Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab fishery took place 
during a ten-week period 
from the middle of 
October to the middle of 
December.  The number 
of participating vessels 
peaked at 72 during the 
second and third weeks 
and declined to less than 
30 by the seventh week. 
 
Catch per unit of effort 
(CPUE) declined from 41 
in the first week to 22 by 
the fourth week and 15 by 
the eighth week. 
 
I did not have data on 
which vessels fished in 
which weeks.  However, 
available preliminary 
ADFG data suggest that 
most of the fleet fished 
for 2-3 weeks near the 
beginning of the season, 
with relatively high catch 
per unit of effort (CPUE) 
compared to historical 
averages.  A smaller 
number fished much 
longer seasons, with 
CPUE declining as the 
season progressed.  
 
Data in Figures  II-9 
through II-11 are from 
“Review of major BSAI 
crab fisheries, 2005/06,” 
a powerpoint presentation 
prepared by Forrest R. 
Bowers, ADFG, May 
2006.  The data are 
preliminary estimates. 
 Figure II-9 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery 2005




































































Week ending date  
Figure II-10 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery 2005






































































Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery 2005


































































Table II-6 provides an overview of changes in the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery between 
the 2005 season and the 2006 season. 
 
Table II-6 
Type of measure Measure 2004 2005/06 Change % Change
Harvest (000 pounds) 23,036 30,840 7,803 34%
Number of pots pulled 69,617 114,161 44,544 64%
Number of landings 196 274 78 40%
Average pots registered per vessel 79 172 93 118%
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 240 180 -60 -25%
Number of vessels registered 164 80 -84 -51%
Number of pots registered 12,930 13,734 804 6%
Average pots pulled per vessel 424 1,427 1,003 236%
Estimated avg. days fished per vessel 5 42 37 740%
Average landings per vessel 1.2 3.4 2.2 187%
Average harvest per vessel (pounds) 140,465 385,495 245,030 174%
Changes in the Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery Between the 2005 and 2005/06 Seasons
Average effort, 
harvest and value 
per vessel








The 2006 harvest was 34% higher than the 2005 harvest, and the total number of landings 
was 40% higher.  The total number of pots pulled was 64% higher (reflecting a 25% 
decline in catch per unit of effort).  Note that these changes were much greater than for 
the Bristol Bay Red King Crab (BBR) fishery, for which harvests and pots pulled 
increased by only 17% and 14%, respectively, and the number of landings stayed about 
the same. 
 
The average number of pots registered per vessel was more than twice as high, again in 
contrast to the BBR fishery for which average pots registered per vessel declined.   
 
The number of vessels registered fell dramatically from 164 to 80—or by about one-half.  
However, the relative decline was less dramatic than for the BBR fishery, for which 
vessel participation fell by almost two-thirds. 
 
With the decline in vessel participation and CPUE, there was a dramatic increase in 
average effort per vessel.  The average number of pots pulled per vessel more than tripled 
from 424 to 1427. 
 
Similarly, there was a dramatic increase in average landings and catches per vessel.  
Average landings per vessel almost tripled from 1.2 to 3.4, and average harvest per vessel 
almost tripled from 140 thousand pounds to 385 thousand pounds. 
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Figure II-13 
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Figure II-14 
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Figure II-15 















Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery, 2003-2006:
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Figure II-17 
Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery, 2003-2006:
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Figure II-18 
Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery, 2003-2006:
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Figure II-19 
Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery, 2003-2006:
Average Days Fished per Vessel


















Almost all of the 2006 
Bering Sea Snow Crab 
fishery took place during 
a fifteen-week period 
from the middle of 
January to the end of 
April.  The highest 
weekly participation was 
43 vessels.  The seasons 
lasted longer and vessel 
participation, average 
catches per unit of effort, 
and weekly harvests 
were distributed more 
uniformly across the 
season than for the 
Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab fishery.  
Participation and 
harvests peaked twice, in 
late January and mid-
March. 
 
I did not have data on 
which vessels fished in 
which weeks.  However, 
available preliminary 
ADFG data suggest that 
individual vessels 
participated at different 
times during the season, 
for more weeks on 
average than for the 
Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab fishery.  
 
Data in Figures  II-20 
through II-22 are from 
“Review of major BSAI 
crab fisheries, 2005/06,” 
a powerpoint 
presentation prepared by 
Forrest R. Bowers, 
ADFG, May 2006.  The 
data are preliminary 
estimates. 
 Figure II-20 
Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery 2006












































































Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery 2006







































































Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery 2006







































































III.  EFFECTS OF RATIONALIZATION ON KODIAK VESSEL 
PARTICIPATION IN BSAI CRAB FISHERIES 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the extent of fleet consolidation in the BSAI crab fisheries which 
occurred in 2005/06, and in particular changes in Kodiak vessel participation in these 
fisheries.   As noted above, the extent of consolidation in the first year of BSAI crab 
rationalization was dramatic.   
 
For this study I have not analyzed why consolidation occurred, nor am I concluding that 
the extent of consolidation was good or bad or too much or too little.  My general 
understanding from talking with vessel owners is that high fuel prices and high quota 
lease rates probably contributed to the extent of consolidation.  Note that the number of 
vessels which fished in 2005/06 is not necessarily an indication of how many may fish in 
the future.  As quotas, prices and costs change, the number of vessels participating in the 
fishery in the future could increase or decrease compared with this year.   
 
The analysis in this chapter is based upon lists provided by the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game of the vessels which registered for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery 
and the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery in 2004/05 and 2005/06.  There were 259 vessels 
which registered for at least one of these fisheries in at least one of these years. 
 
Table III-1 summarizes the combinations of vessel registration in these two fisheries for 
these two years. There were 67 vessels (26%) which registered for both fisheries in both 
years.  There were 79 vessels (31%) which registered for both fisheries in 2004/05 but in 
neither fishery in 2005/06.  There were 73 vessels (29%) which registered only for the 
2004/05 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery.  Other registration combinations accounted 
for the remaining 40 vessels (14%). 
 
Table III-1 
BBR BSS BBR BSS
2004/05 2004/05 2005/06 2005/06
X X X X 67 26%
X X 79 31%
X 73 29%
X X X 11 4%
X X X 9 4%
X X X 3 1%
X X 8 3%





Combinations of Vessel Registration in the
Bristol Bay Red King Crab and Bering Sea Snow Crab Fisheries
in 2004/05 and 2005/06
Year and Fishery Participation Combinations
Number of 
vessels
Total number of vessels  
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Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, the total number of vessels registering for at least one of 
the two major BSAI crab fisheries fell from 254 to 99 (a decline of 61%).  Only 39% of 
the vessels which registered for at least one fishery in 2004/05 registered for at least one 
fishery in 2005/06 (Table III-2 and Figure III-1). 
 
Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, the total number of vessels registering for the Bristol Bay 
Red King Crab fishery fell from 251 to 89 (a decline of 65%), and the total number of 
vessels registering for the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery fell from 169 to 80 (a decline of 
53%).8   
 
Table III-2 
2004/05 2005/06 2004/05 2005/06 Change % Change
Either Fishery:  TOTAL 254 99 100% 39% -155 -61%
Bristol Bay Red King Crab:  TOTAL 251 89 99% 35% -162 -65%
Bering Sea Snow Crab:  TOTAL 169 80 67% 31% -89 -53%
Both Fisheries 166 70 65% 28% -96 -58%
Only Bristol Bay Red King Crab 85 19 33% 7% -66 -78%
Only Bering Sea Snow Crab 3 10 1% 4% 7 233%
Neither Fishery 0 155 0% 61% 155
Note:  A total of 254 vessels registered for at least one fishery in 2004/05.  All of the vessels which registered 
in 2005/06 had registered for at least one fishery in 2004/05.
Number of Vessels Which Registered for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab





























                                                 
8 Note that fishery participation may be slightly smaller than the number of vessels which registered.  For 
both fisheries and years, the number of vessels which registered in both years is identical to the “number of 
vessels” reported in “Review of major BSAI crab fisheries, 2005/06” (powerpoint presentation prepared by 
Forrest R. Bowers, ADFG, May 2006), except that for the Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery in 2004/05, the 
number of vessels which registered was 169 while the “number of vessels” in “Review of major BSAI crab 
fisheries, 2005/06” was 164. 
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A starting point for my analysis for this report was to estimate the changes in 
participation in these fisheries by Kodiak vessels.  However, there isn’t any clear 
definition of a “Kodiak Vessel.”  Potential definitions of a “Kodiak Vessel” might be 
based, for example, upon where the owner lives, where the vessel is usually docked when 
it is not fishing, or whether the vessel rents a slip in the harbor.  Any of these indicators 
may change over time if the owner moves, the vessel is sold, or the vessel’s fishery 
participation change.  
 
In order to get a general sense of which crab vessels might be “Kodiak Boats,” I showed 
the 2004/05 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery vessel registration list to a number of 
Kodiak residents involved with or knowledgeable about Kodiak fishing (the harbormaster, 
vessel owners, captains and crew members).  These individuals were generally in 
agreement about (a) which boats were definitely “Kodiak boats” and (b) which boats 
were definitely not “Kodiak boats.”   
 
There were a few boats—about five—on which individuals had differing opinions.  
Generally these were boats that were in Kodiak only some of the time, that were in 
Kodiak less now than they had formerly been, or that had been formerly owned by a 
Kodiak resident but which had been sold. 
 
Based on these individuals’ opinions, I developed the list shown below of those vessels 
which had registered for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery in 2004/05 which I 
assumed—for the purposes of the analysis in this report—to be “Kodiak Boats.”   
 
Table III-3 
ALASKA CHALLENGER HANDLER MELANIE
ALASKA SPIRIT ICE LANDER MIDNITE SUN
ALICIA JEAN INCENTIVE NORDIC VIKING
ALPINE COVE IRENE H NORTH POINT
AMERICAN WAY ISLAND MIST NUKA ISLAND
ARGOSY JEANOAH OBSESSION
ATLANTICO KATHERINE OCEAN BAY
BIG BLUE KATRINA EM PACIFIC STAR
BIG VALLEY KODIAK PACIFIC VENTURE
BOTANY BAY LADY ALASKA PERSEVERANCE
BUCCANEER LADY ALEUTIAN PROVIDER
CHISIK ISLAND LADY HELEN RUFF & REDDY
CORNELIA MARIE LADY KISKA SAGA
COUGAR LADY KODIAK SEABROOKE
DETERMINED LUCKY LADY SILVER SPRAY
ELIZABETH F MAR DEL SUD STORM BIRD
FOUR DAUGHTERS MARCY J TRAIL BLAZER
GUARDIAN MARY J VIEKODA BAY
Vessels which Registered for the 2004/05 Bristol Bay King Crab Fishery
Which I Assumed to be "Kodiak Boats" for this Preliminary Analysis 
 
 
I emphasize that this is not a “scientific” list.  Nor can I claim any personal expertise at 
all as to which boats are “Kodiak Boats.”  (There are probably hundreds of Kodiak 
residents more qualified to make this kind of judgment.)  Probably many readers of this 
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report might suggest a few boats which should be left off or added to this list.  However, I 
believe that the list is reasonable for the purposes of this preliminary analysis.  Changing 
the list slightly—adding or removing a few boats—would not significantly change any of 
the conclusions of this analysis.9 
 
Table III-5 summarizes the combinations of vessel registration for the 54 “Kodiak Boats” 
in the two major BSAI fisheries in 2004/05 and 2005/06. There were 16 vessels (30%) 
which registered for both fisheries in both years.  There were 13 vessels (24%) which 
registered for both fisheries in 2004/05 but in neither fishery in 2005/06.  There were 15 
vessels (28%) which registered only for the 2004/05 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery.  
Other registration combinations accounted for the remaining 10 vessels (19%). 
 
Table III-5 
BBR BSS BBR BSS
2004/05 2004/05 2005/06 2005/06
X X X X 16 30%
X X 13 24%
X 15 28%
X X X 6 11%
X X X 3 6%
X X 1 2%
54 100%Total number of vessels
Percent of 
vessels
Combinations of "Kodiak Boat" Registration in the
Bristol Bay Red King Crab and Bering Sea Snow Crab Fisheries
in 2004/05 and 2005/06





                                                 
9 I had originally planned to base my list of “Kodiak Boats” based upon the “home ports” listed in the 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game’s 2004 vessel database.  However, upon talking with Kodiak 
residents it quickly became clear that they did not consider the “home port” listed in the ADFG 2004 vessel 
database to be an accurate indicator of which boats were “Kodiak Boats.”  As shown in the table, for 5 of 
the vessels considered “Kodiak Boats” by Kodiak residents, the ADFG vessel database listed home ports in 
other Alaska communities, and for 9 of these boats the ADFG vessel database listed home ports in other 
states.  In addition, the ADFG vessel database listed Kodiak as home port for 5 vessels not considered 





Kodiak Boats 40 5 9 54
Non-Kodiak Boats 5 48 147 200
Total 45 53 156 254
Home Port in ADFG 2004 Vessel Database
Total
Comparision of  "Kodiak Boats" with Home Port in ADFG 2004 Vessel Database
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Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, the total number of “Kodiak Boats” registering for at least 
one of the two major BSAI crab fisheries fell from 54 to 26 (a decline of 52%).  Only 
48% of the “Kodiak Boats” which registered for at least one fishery in 2004/05 registered 
for at least one fishery in 2005/06 (Table III-2 and Figure III-1). 
 
Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, the total number of “Kodiak Boats” registering for the 
Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery fell from 54 to 23 (a decline of 57%), and the total 
number of vessels registering for the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery fell from 38 to 19 (a 
decline of 50%). 
 
Table III-6 
2004/05 2005/06 2004/05 2005/06 Change % Change
Either Fishery:  TOTAL 54 26 100% 48% -28 -52%
Bristol Bay Red King Crab:  TOTAL 54 23 100% 43% -31 -57%
Bering Sea Snow Crab:  TOTAL 38 19 70% 35% -19 -50%
Both Fisheries 38 16 70% 30% -22 -58%
Only Bristol Bay Red King Crab 16 7 30% 13% -9 -56%
Only Bering Sea Snow Crab 0 3 0% 6% 3
Neither Fishery 0 28 0% 52% 28
Note:  A total 54 "Kodiak Boats" registered for at least one fishery in 2004/05.
Number of "Kodiak Boats" Which Registered for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab




Number of "Kodiak Boats" Which Registered for the Two Major























Not all of the decline in vessel participation in the 2004/05 BSAI crab fisheries is 
attributable to rationalization.  As shown in Table III-7, of the vessels which registered 
for either of the two 2004/05 major BSAI crab fisheries, 155 did not register for either 
fishery in 2005/06.  Of these 155 vessels, 23 were “bought out” under the buyback 
program, one of which was a Kodiak Boat.  In addition, one “Kodiak Boat,” the Big 
Valley, was lost at the start of the 2004/05 Bering Sea Snow Crab season.  The remaining 
131 boats which did not register left the crab fishery for other reasons—which were 
presumably associated with crab rationalization. 
 
Based on this reasoning, crab rationalization accounted for about 85% of the decline in 
the number of vessels registering for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab season, and 99% of 
the decline in the number of vessels registering for the Bering Sea Snow Crab season.  
Similarly, crab rationalization accounted for about 94% of the decline in the number of 
“Kodiak Boats” registering for the Bristol Bay Red King Crab season, and 95% of the 
decline in the number of “Kodiak Boats” registering for the Bering Sea Snow Crab 

















% other reasons 
(presumably 
rationalization)
Either fishery 254 99 155 23 1 131 15% 85%
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 251 89 162 23 1 138 15% 85%
Bering Sea Snow Crab* 169 76 97 0 1 96 1% 99%
Either fishery 54 26 28 1 1 26 7% 93%
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 54 23 31 1 1 29 6% 94%
Bering Sea Snow Crab 38 19 19 0 1 18 5% 95%
Either fishery 200 73 127 22 0 105 17% 83%
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 197 66 131 22 0 109 17% 83%
Bering Sea Snow Crab* 131 57 78 0 0 78 0% 100%
Reasons for Changes in Fishery Participation Between 2004/05 and 2005/06
Did not register in 2005/06



















Table III-8 below summarizes the data on which the analysis in this chapter of “Kodiak 











Atlantico 37 X X X X
Provider 58 X X X X
Nordic Viking 8500 X X X X
Mar Del Sud 21652 X X X X
Trailblazer 33704 X X X X
Obsession 34374 X X X X
Determined 35306 X X X X
Seabrooke 36800 X X X X
Big Blue 37241 X X X X
Four Daughters 41444 X X X X
Storm Bird 46854 X X X X
Cornelia Marie 59109 X X X X
Silver Spray 60860 X X X X
Lady Alaska 61351 X X X X
Island Mist 61791 X X X X
Handler 62436 X X X X
Kodiak 3525 X X X
Alaska Challenger 4100 X X X
Melanie 20363 X X X
Nuka Island 35640 X X X
Botany Bay 45066 X X X
Incentive 63000 X X X
Alaska Spirit 35949 X X X
Viekoda Bay 57971 X X X
Guardian 61571 X X X
Big Valley** 23460 X X
Icelander 2 X X
Lady Helen 16 X X
Pacific Venture 986 X X
Saga 11022 X X
Lady Kiska 35522 X X
Katrina Em 38972 X X
Mary J 40217 X X
Lady Aleutian 41715 X X
Pacific Star 59521 X X
Alicia Jean 60865 X X
Lady Kodiak 61352 X X
Perseverance 63219 X X
Elizabeth F 14767 X X
American Way* 47839 X
Buccaneer 25 X
Ruff & Reddy 53 X
Marcy J 55 X
Midnite Sun 65 X
Lucky Lady 6485 X
Cougar 6700 X
Irene H 6710 X
Chisik Island 12512 X
Jeanoah 14963 X
Alpine Cove 30100 X
Argosy 38547 X
North Point 53800 X
Katherine 58133 X
Ocean Bay 68008 X
*Bought out in crab vessel buyback program.  **Lost during 2004/05 Bering Sea Snow Crab season.





                                                 
10 In June 2006 I plan to revise this draft preliminary analysis to address review comments and questions.  I 
invite comments on the list of “Kodiak Boats,” as well as corrections to any errors this table may contain.  I 
may be contacted at 907-786-7717 or Gunnar.Knapp@uaa.alaska.edu.  
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IV.  EFFECTS OF RATIONALIZATION ON KODIAK CRAB FISHING JOBS 
 
In this chapter, I estimate effects of rationalization on Kodiak crab fishing jobs and days 
worked in crab fishing.  This involves several steps, which are summarized in Table IV-1.  
Each step requires making assumptions.  Some of these assumptions are uncertain 




Quality of Information on Which
to Base Assumptions
Estimate total 
changes in jobs on 
Kodiak Boats and 
other boats
Average jobs per boat 
before and after 
rationalization
Medium:  No data are available on average crew size 
before or after rationalization,but anecdotal evidence is 
fairly consistent.  It is uncertain whether average crew 
sizes have changed.
Estimate change in 
jobs for Kodiak 
residents
Percentage of jobs held 
by Kodiak residents on 
"Kodiak Boats" and  on 
Non-Kodiak Boats
Low.  We don't have any reliable data on where crew 
live.  We do have data however on where crab permit 
holders (usually captains) live.
Estimate changes in 
days worked
Days worked per crab 
fishing job
Low.  Available ADFG data on "average fishing days" 
are preliminary.  No data are available on average days 
spent in transit, in port between landings, or working in 
Kodiak before and after the season.
Steps in Estimating Changes in Kodiak Crab Fishing Jobs and Days Worked 
 
 
In this chapter, I begin by using “best guess” assumptions for each step in order to 
develop “best guess” estimates of effects of rationalization on Kodiak jobs.  Then I show 
how changing different assumptions changes the estimated effects of rationalization on 
Kodiak jobs and hours worked. 
 
For this study, I use the term “job” to refer to working on a crab fishing boat for a season 
for a particular BSAI crab fishery.  The job includes not only days spent fishing but also 
work done in port before and after the season as well as transit time to the Bering Sea.  In 
previous seasons these were relatively short-term jobs, lasting a few weeks of very hard 
work.  With rationalization crab fishing jobs last longer (and vary considerably in how 
long they last, because boats vary in how much quota they catch and how long they fish 
for it).   
 
I did not have any data on how many people work on Bering Sea crab boats.  Most 
people I talked with told me that most Bering Sea crab boats fish with either 5 or 6 people 
working on board (captain and crew total).  As a starting “best guess” I assumed an 
average of 5.5 crab fishing jobs per vessel.  To estimate total crab fishing jobs before and 
after rationalization, I multiplied the number of vessels fishing by 5.5.11   
 
During the 2005/06 season, some boats which had fished for BSAI crab in earlier seasons 
participated in other fisheries—in effect creating new jobs in those fisheries.  I haven’t 
estimated how many of these new jobs were created because I did not have any data on 
                                                 
11 With rationalization, the number of people working on some boats declined.  Later in this chapter, I show 
how assuming a lower average crew size after rationalization would affect the estimated loss in jobs. 
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how many boats which left the crab fishery participated in other fisheries.  To the extent 
that new jobs were created in other fisheries, my analysis overstates fishing job losses 
due to rationalization.  Note, however, that earnings from working in other fisheries were 
probably less than earnings had been in the crab fisheries. 
 
Assuming an average of 5.5 jobs per vessel, the decline in the number of boats fishing 
between 2004/05 and 2005/06 resulted in a loss of 891 total jobs in the Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab fishery and 462 jobs in the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery.  Adjusting for the 
percentage of the decline in vessel participation attributable to rationalization (rather than 
buyback and vessel losses), rationalization resulted in an estimated loss of 757 total jobs 
in the BBR fishery, of which 160 were on “Kodiak Boats,” and an estimated loss of  457 









2004/05 251 54 197 164 38 126
2005/06 89 23 66 80 19 61
Change -162 -31 -131 -84 -19 -65
2004/05 1381 297 1084 902 209 693
2005/06 490 127 363 440 105 336
Change -891 -171 -721 -462 -105 -358
85% 94% 83% 99% 95% 100%
757 160 598 457 99 358
% of job losses attributable to 
rationalization*
Estimated job losses due to 
rationalization
Estimated Job Losses in Major BSAI Crab Fisheries Between 2004/05 and 2005/06
Note:  Assumes average of 5.5 jobs per vessel.  *Based on percentage of vessels not registering in 2005/06 
for reasons other than buyback or vessel loss (see Table III-7 for derivation).  Totals may not add exactly due 
to rounding.
































The number of jobs lost by Kodiak residents is different from the loss of jobs on “Kodiak 
boats”—because not everyone working on a Kodiak boat is a Kodiak resident, and some 
Kodiak residents work on non-Kodiak boats.  To estimate job losses for Kodiak residents, 
I had to adjust for percentage of jobs held by Kodiak residents.  There are no data where 
crab fishing crew live, or the extent the people who work on Kodiak Boats are Kodiak 
residents.  However, data are available on where crab permit-holders live.12  I used the 
percentage of 2004/05 permit-holders who were Kodiak residents (Tables IV-3 through 
IV-6) as “best guess” assumptions for how many crab jobs were held by Kodiak residents.   
 
Table IV-3 
"Kodiak Boats" Other Boats Total
Kodiak 35 4 39
Other communities 19 191 210
Unknown 2 2
Total 54 197 251
65% 2% 16%
Source:  Based on permit holder residency reported in CFEC Permit Holder Database 2004.
% Kodiak residents






"Kodiak Boats" Other Boats Total
Kodiak 12 12
Other communities 11 65 76
Unknown 1 1
Total 23 66 89
52% 0% 13%
Source:  Based on permit holder residency reported in CFEC Permit Holder Database 2005.







"Kodiak Boats" Other Boats Total
Kodiak 19 2 21
Other communities 19 126 145
Unknown 3 3
Total 38 131 169
50% 2% 12%
Source:  Based on permit holder residency reported in CFEC Permit Holder Database 2005.







"Kodiak Boats" Other Boats Total
Kodiak 10 10
Other communities 9 60 69
Unknown 1 1
Total 19 61 80
53% 0% 13%
Source:  Based on permit holder residency reported in CFEC Permit Holder Database 2005.  Note:  
Actual permit holders may have differed for this fishery, which took place in 2006.





                                                 
12 Every vessel delivering crab must have an ADFG permit holder on board, who signs the fish ticket.  The 
permit holder is usually the vessel captain.   
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During the 2004/05 season, about two-thirds (65%) of the permit holders on “Kodiak 
Boats” in the BBR fishery were Kodiak residents, and half (50%) of the permit holders in 
the BSS fishery were Kodiak residents.  Only 2% of the permit holders on other boats 
were Kodiak residents.  Assuming similar Kodiak residency shares for all the jobs on 
crab fishing vessels, rationalization resulted in an estimated loss of 104 jobs for Kodiak 
residents in the BBR fishery and 59 jobs for Kodiak residents in the BSS fishery (Table 










2004/05 251 54 197 164 38 126
2005/06 89 23 66 80 19 61
2004/05 1381 297 1084 902 209 693
2005/06 490 127 363 440 105 336
Kodiak residents 65% 2% 50% 2%
Non-Kodiak residents 35% 98% 50% 98%
Total 1381 297 1084 902 209 693
Kodiak residents 215 193 22 118 105 14
Non-Kodiak residents 1166 104 1062 784 105 679
Total 490 127 363 440 105 336
Kodiak residents 89 82 7 59 52 7
Non-Kodiak residents 400 44 356 381 52 329
Total 891 171 721 462 105 358
Kodiak residents 125 111 14 59 52 7
Non-Kodiak residents 766 60 706 403 52 350
Percentage*** 85% 94% 83% 99% 95% 100%
Total 757 160 598 457 99 358
Kodiak residents 106 104 12 59 50 7
Non-Kodiak residents 651 56 586 399 50 350
*Based on residency of vessel permit holders calculated in Tables IV-2 and IV-4.
***Based on percentage of vessels not registering in 2005/06 for reasons other than buyback or vessel loss (see 
Table III-7 for derivation).  Totals may not add exactly due to rounding.
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Estimated Crab Fishing Job Losses of Kodiak Residents Between 2004/05 and 2005/06




























The estimates shown in Table IV-7 of crab fishing job losses due to rationalization are 
based on several “best guess” assumptions.  Table IV-8 shows how changing some of 
these assumptions changes the estimates of job losses due to rationalization. 
 
Table IV-8 
A B C D F
2004/05 5.5 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0
2005/06 5.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.0
2004/05 65% 65% 65% 75% 65% 75%
2005/06 65% 65% 52% 75% 65% 75%
2004/05 50% 50% 50% 75% 50% 75%
2005/06 50% 50% 53% 75% 50% 75%
2004/05 2% 2% 2% 5% 2% 5%
2005/06 2% 2% 0% 5% 2% 5%
2004/05 2% 2% 2% 5% 2% 5%
2005/06 2% 2% 0% 5% 2% 5%
Kodiak boats, BBR 94% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100%
Other boats, BBR 83% 83% 83% 83% 100% 100%
Kodiak boats, BSS 95% 95% 95% 95% 100% 100%
Other boats, BSS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
BBR 106 116 127 139 125 179
BSS 59 64 62 95 59 105
BBR 651 710 631 618 766 793
BSS 399 435 395 362 403 399
BBR 757 826 757 757 891 972
BSS 457 499 457 457 462 504
Alternative Assumptions





Estimated job losses due to rationalization
Assumptions*
Kodiak resident share of 
jobs on other boats, BSS
% of job losses attributable 
to rationalization
Kodiak Residents
Those assumptions which are different from the "best guess assumptions are shown in bold.
Average jobs per vessel
Kodiak resident share of 
jobs on Kodiak Boats, BBR
Kodiak resident share of 
jobs on Kodiak Boats, BSS
Kodiak resident share of 
jobs on other boats, BBR
 
 
Alternative Assumptions A.  If we assume that the average jobs per vessel decreased 
from 6.0 to 5.0 (rather than staying constant at 5.5) then the estimated Kodak resident job 
loss due to rationalization increases from 106 to 116 for the BBR fishery and from 59 to 
64 for the BSS fishery. 
 
Alternative Assumptions B.  If we assume that the share of crab jobs held by Kodiak 
residents in 2005/06 was equal to the share of permit holders on vessels in 2005/06 
(rather than to the share of permit holders on vessels in 2004/06), then the estimated 
Kodiak resident job loss increases to 127 for the BBR fishery and 62 for the BBS fishery. 
 
Alternative Assumptions C.  If we assume higher Kodiak resident shares of crab fishing 
jobs of 75% of jobs on Kodiak boats and 5% of jobs on other boats, for both fisheries in 
both years, then the estimated Kodiak resident job loss increases to 139 for the BBR 
fishery and 95 for the BSS fishery. 
 
Alternative Assumptions D.  If we assume that 100% of job losses are due to 
rationalization, then the estimated Kodiak resident job loss increases to 125 for the BBR 
fishery but stays the same for the BSS fishery. 
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Alternative Assumptions E.  If we use the A, C and D assumptions together, then the 
estimated Kodiak resident job loss increases to 179 for the BBR fishery and 105 for the 
BSS fishery.  I would consider this a maximum or upper-bound estimate of the Kodiak 
crab fishing job losses attributable to rationalization.  
 
Many people have pointed out to me that, although rationalization caused a dramatic 
decline in the number of crab fishing jobs, it was important to keep in mind that the 
remaining jobs lasted longer.  Clearly the total amount of work being done in the crab 
fishery, as measured by the number of pots pulled and the volume of the crab harvest 
(shown in Tables II-5 and II-6), has not declined with rationalization.   
 
As an alternative measure of the effects of rationalization on crab fishing employment, I 
estimated how the number of days worked in the fishery changed.  To do this, I 
multiplied the estimated number of crab fishing jobs in 2004/05 and 2005/06 by “best 
guess” assumptions about the average days worked in 2004/05 and 2005/06. 
 
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game has estimated that the average number of 
“days fished” in the BBR fishery increased from 3 days in 2004/05 to 26 days in 2005/06, 
and that the average number of “days fished” in the BSS fishery increased from 5 days in 
2004/05 to 42 days in 2005/06.  Note, however, that these estimates are preliminary and 
may change.  Note also that the number of days fished varied widely for different vessels, 
reflecting variation in the total crab quota which they harvested. 
 
The number of days worked in the crab fisheries is considerably higher than the number 
of days fished, if we include days working on the boat in port before and after the season, 
days transiting from Kodiak or other ports to the Bering Sea, days spent in Dutch Harbor 
or other Bering Sea ports delivering crab and loading or unloading pots, and days 
traveling between these ports and the fishing grounds.  However, no data are available on 
how many days are spent in these other activities that are an integral part of crab fishing.   
 
Table IV-9 (on the following page) shows the total days of work for BBR and BSS 
fishing jobs under alternative assumptions about days spent in these different crab fishing 
activities.  For example, depending upon which assumptions we use, the total days 
worked per job in the BBR fishery may have been between 11 and 17 days in 2004/05 
and between 34 and 44 days in 2005/06.   
 
I used the numbers shown in bold font as “best guess” assumptions about average days 
worked in each fishery—but these should not be considered “precise” or “accurate.”13  
Under these assumptions, in the BBR fishery days worked per job increased from 14 in 
2004/05 to 39 in 2005/06, and in the BSS fishery days worked per job increased from 16 
to 55.  The ratio of days worked per job in 2005/06 to days worked per job in 2004/05 
was 2.8 for the BBR fishery and 3.4 for the BSS fishery.  
                                                 
13 Note that for purposes of estimating how rationalization affected total days worked, what really matters 
is what we assume about how the relative number of total days worked per job changed.  For example, if 
the number of jobs decreased by two-thirds, the number of days worked would stay the same if the number 
































11 3 4 4 0 1.1 0
12 3 4 4 1 1.1 1
13 3 4 4 2 1.1 2
13 3 6 4 0 1.1 0
14 3 6 4 1 1.1 1
15 3 6 4 2 1.1 2
15 3 8 4 0 1.1 0
16 3 8 4 1 1.1 1
17 3 8 4 2 1.1 2
34 26 4 4 0 3.0 0
37 26 4 4 3 3.0 1
40 26 4 4 6 3.0 2
36 26 6 4 0 3.0 0
39 26 6 4 3 3.0 1
42 26 6 4 6 3.0 2
38 26 8 4 0 3.0 0
41 26 8 4 3 3.0 1
44 26 8 4 6 3.0 2
13 5 4 4 0 1.2 0
14 5 4 4 1 1.2 1
15 5 4 4 2 1.2 2
15 5 6 4 0 1.2 0
16 5 6 4 1 1.2 1
17 5 6 4 2 1.2 2
17 5 8 4 0 1.2 0
18 5 8 4 1 1.2 1
19 5 8 4 2 1.2 2
50 42 4 4 0 3.4 0
53 42 4 4 3 3.4 1
57 42 4 4 7 3.4 2
52 42 6 4 0 3.4 0
55 42 6 4 3 3.4 1
59 42 6 4 7 3.4 2
54 42 8 4 0 3.4 0
57 42 8 4 3 3.4 1
61 42 8 4 7 3.4 2
*Based on ADFG estimates from Tables II-3 and II-4.  2005/06 estimates are preliminary.
Estimates shown in bold are used for Table IV-8.
Bering Sea Snow 
Crab Fishery, 
2005/06
Estimated Total Days of Work for Bering Sea Fishing Jobs, Under Alternative Assumptions
Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab Fishery, 
2004/05
Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab Fishery, 
2005/06






Based on these assumptions about days worked per job, the total days or years worked by 
Kodiak residents in the BBR and BSS crab fisheries stayed about the same in 2005/06 as 
in 2004/05.  Put differently, the loss in jobs was approximately offset by the increase in 
days worked per job.  A smaller number of people worked at crab fishing jobs which 
lasted longer, and did about the same amount of work in about the same number of total 
days.   
 
Table IV-10 
Total "Kodiak Boats" Other Boats Total
"Kodiak 
Boats" Other Boats
2004/05 1381 297 1084 902 209 693
2005/06 490 127 363 440 105 336
2004/05 14 14 16 16
2005/06 39 39 55 55
2004/05 19327 4158 15169 14432 3344 11088
2005/06 19091 4934 14157 24200 5748 18453
Change -237 776 -1012 9768 2404 7365
2004/05 81 17 63 60 14 46
2005/06 80 21 59 101 24 77
Change -1 3 -4 41 10 31
Kodiak residents* 65% 2% 50% 2%
Non-Kodiak residents 35% 98% 50% 98%
Total** -1 3 -4 41 10 31
Kodiak residents 2 2 0 6 5 1
Non-Kodiak residents -3 1 -4 35 5 30
Percentage*** 85% 94% 83% 99% 95% 100%
Total** -1 3 -3 40 10 31
Kodiak residents 2 2 0 6 5 1
Non-Kodiak residents -3 1 -3 35 5 30
Assumed residency (%)
Estimated work year 
losses, 2004/05 to 
2005/06
Estimated work year 
losses attributable to 
rationalization
Estimated Change in Years Worked in Major BSAI Crab Fisheries Between 2004/05 and 2005/06
(A Very Rough Approximation for Purposes of Illustration)
*From Table IV-2.  **Based on assumptions shown in bold in Table IV-7.  ***Assumes 48 5-day work weeks per year.  
Note:  Estimates of changes in work years for Kodiak residents in the bottom half of the table are based on the same 
assumptions used in Table IV-7.
Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery
Estimated fishing jobs*









V.  EFFECTS OF RATIONALIZATION ON CRAB FISHING EARNINGS 
OF KODIAK CAPTAINS AND CREW 
 
The previous chapter looked at the crab fishing jobs which were lost due to crab 
rationalization.  This chapter looks at the crab fishing jobs which remain after crab 
rationalization. 
 
As shown in Table V-1, in the first year of crab rationalization, the number of crab 
fishing jobs declined significantly.  However, as was discussed in Chapter II, the total 
amount of work being done in the crab fisheries—as measured by the total harvest and 
the number of pots lifted—stayed about the same.  This is reflected in the estimates of 
crab fishing work-years shown in Table V-1, which stayed about the same for the Bristol 
Bay Red King Crab fishery and increased for the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery.  These 
work-years estimates should be considered highly approximate.  The important point to 














Bristol Bay Red King Crab 215 1166 1381 14 13 68 81
Bering Sea Snow Crab 118 784 902 16 8 52 60
Total 333 1949 2283 20 120 141
Bristol Bay Red King Crab -125 -766 -891 25 2 -3 -1
Bering Sea Snow Crab -59 -403 -462 39 6 35 41
Total -185 -1168 -1353 8 32 40
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 89 400 490 39 15 65 80
Bering Sea Snow Crab 59 381 440 55 14 87 101
Total 148 781 930 28 152 180
Estimated Work-Years**Estimated Number of Jobs







*Assumed work days per job, and the estimates of work-years which are based on them, are based on limited 
preliminary information and should be considered highly approximate.  **Estimated work-years are calculated based on 
the assumption that one work-year has 48 5-day weeks.  Source:  Estimates derived in Tables IV-7 and IV-9.   
 
With much longer fishing seasons, most BSAI crab fishing jobs lasted much longer.  In 
addition, there were other important changes in these jobs, particularly in how captains 
and crew were paid and what they earned. 
 
To understand these changes, it is important first to understand how crab fishermen were 
typically paid prior to rationalization.  On most boats, captains and crew were paid a 
share of net earnings after deducting taxes and costs of fuel and bait.  After calculating 
individual shares, costs of groceries were also deducted from what fishermen were paid.  
The specific details of how payments were calculated varied from boat to boat, with 
regard to what costs were deducted before calculating net earnings, and the shares paid to 
individual captains and crew.  Typically, however, the total share paid to the “deck” 
(everyone working on the boat) was about 40%:—somewhat higher on some boats, and 
somewhat lower on others.   
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Figure V-1 shows where gross earnings went for two Kodiak vessels for the 2003 Bristol 
Bay Red King crab season, based on copies of the crew settlement sheets provided by the 
vessel owner. Note that on these boats the “deck” received about 40% of net earnings.  
After deducting costs of taxes, fuel and bait, the payment to the “deck” was about 34% of 
the gross earnings.   
 
Figure V-1 
















Net income was 
shared between 
the vessel owner 
and the crew.  
(The crew was 
charged for 
groceries.)






The "deck" was 
paid 39% of 
net income on 
Vessel A and 
41% on Vessel 
B.  Payment to 







about twice as 





An obvious but important point illustrated by this graph is that the fishermen on Vessel B 
earned only about half as much for their season as those on Vessel A—because they only 
caught about half as much.  Put simply, not all crab fishing jobs are the same.  Fishermen 
on some boats earn much more than fishermen on other boats.  This makes it more 
difficult to summarize how fishermen’s earnings have been affected by rationalization. 
 
Figure V-2 (on the next page) makes the same point in a different way.  It shows average 
earnings in the BSAI crab fishery prior to rationalization, by quartile group.  Boats in 
each of the four quartile groups had approximately equal total earnings.  This means that 
the 37 boats in the top quartile group in 2004 had average earnings almost three time as 




































Number of permit 
holders in 2004:
First quartile:  37
Second quartile:  47
Third quartile:  62
Fourth quartile:  105
 
 
As a rough approximation, a “typical” crab fishing crewman might have been paid about 
6% of a vessel’s net earnings or about 5% of a vessel’s gross earnings.  Figure V-3 shows 
the implied average earnings for a “typical” crewman in each quartile group.  Note that 
fishermen working on the boats in the top quartile group would have earned much more 
than those working on boats in the bottom quartile group.  
 
Figure V-3 
Approximate Average Earnings per Crewman in the Bristol Bay Red King Crab Fishery,
































Number of boats in 
2004:
First quartile:  37
Second quartile:  47
Third quartile:  62
Fourth quartile:  105
 
 
Note also that fishermen’s earnings in the BSAI crab fisheries prior to rationalization 
varied widely from year to year, depending upon catches and ex-vessel prices.  In 
addition, fishermen’s earnings were uncertain or “risky.”  Before the season, crab 
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fishermen did not know how much money they were going to earn.  If they boat caught a 
lot of crab, they might earn a lot.  If the boat didn’t catch a lot of crab, they might not 
earn much money at all.  Reflecting this financial risk, as well as the physical difficulty 
and danger of the work, average earnings for BSAI crab fishermen were high for the few 
weeks of work, both compared to earnings in other fisheries as well as jobs on land. 
 
In the first season of rationalization, the share system remained in place on most crab 
vessels, but with one important change.  Of those vessels which fished, many fished for 
not only their own quota, but also additional quota leased from other vessel owners.  On 
most vessels the lease payments to other vessel owners were deducted from gross 
earnings before calculating share payments to captains and crew.   
 
In the Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery, the typical quota lease rate was about 70% of 
ex-vessel value after taxes.  In the Bering Sea Snow Crab fishery, the typical lease rate 
was about 50% of ex-vessel value after taxes.  Deducting this large share of ex-vessel 
value before calculating share payments meant that captains and crew received a much 
smaller share of ex-vessel value for that portion of the vessel’s catch for which the quota 
was leased.  
 
On most vessels there was no corresponding deduction for that part of the vessel’s catch 
for which the quota was owned by the vessel owner.14  In effect, that meant that crew 
were paid differently for fishing quota owned by the vessel owner than for fishing leased 
quota.  It also meant that their share of the total value of the boat’s catch depended on the 
relative share of the catch for which the quota was leased. 
 
How much quota leasing occurred, why it occurred, and what determined quota lease 
rates are important and complicated issues that are all well beyond the scope of this 
preliminary analysis.  In the remainder on this chapter, I discuss in greater detail the 
implications of fleet consolidation and quota leasing for crab fishermen’s earnings. 
 
In considering the effects of rationalization for fishermen’s earnings, it is useful to 
distinguish between boats in terms of the relative share of three kinds of quota in the 
boat’s total catches.  The greater the share of leased quota in the quota fished by the 
vessel, the greater the share of lease payments in the total value of the boat’s catch, and 
the lower the share of value likely to be paid to fishermen. 
 
Type of quota 
Implications for deductions before calculating 
fishermen’s shares 
A.  Quota awarded for the boat’s historical catches Imputed lease payment least likely to be deducted 
B.  Other quota owned by the same vessel owner  Imputed lease payment may be deducted 
C.  Quota leased by the vessel owner Lease payment very likely to be deducted 
 
                                                 
14 Keep in mind, as pointed out in the first chapter, that there is wide variation within the crab fisheries.  
What was deducted before calculating crew payments varied between vessels.  On some vessels owners 
may have deducted imputed lease costs for their own quota.  No data are currently available which would 
make it possible to quantify the extent to which deductions for different kinds of quota were made before 
calculating crew payments. 
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If a boat fished only for quota awarded to the owner for the boat’s historical catches, and 
the vessel owner didn’t deduct an imputed lease payment, then there may have been 
relatively little change in the boat’s costs or the compensation paid to crew. 
 
Some crab vessel owners own more than one boat.  Rather than fish each vessel’s quota 
separately, they used one boat to catch all of their own quota—but didn’t lease any 
additional quota.  This was done by the owner of the two Kodiak vessels for which the 
distribution of earnings in 2003 was shown above in Figure V-1.   
 
As shown in Figure V-4, in 2005 the vessel owner chose to have one boat fish for boat 
boats’ quota.  The owner chose to continue to pay the crew for that boat the same shares, 
calculated in the same way.  As a result, the crew continued to receive approximately the 
same share of ex-vessel value.  The only change in the crew’s share resulted from 
changes in taxes and fuel costs, which are discussed in greater detail below.  If the only 
fleet consolidation occurring with rationalization had been of this type, with no quota 
lease payments and deductions, the smaller number of crab fishermen would have 
continued to receive a similar share of the total ex-vessel value.  
 
Figure V-4 
Comparison of Bristol Bay Red King Crab Earnings and Payments for an
























In 2005, there 
were only half as 
many crew jobs.  
The crew was still 
paid 41% of net 
income.  They 
worked a longer 
season but they 
earned more.  
 
 34 
To examine the implications of quota leasing for crew earnings, I developed a simple 
“crab fishing model” of revenues and costs for a hypothetical crab boat.  The model 
calculates the vessel’s revenues, costs and payments with and without rationalization, and 
how revenues, costs and payments changes as the vessel leases more quota and catches 
more crab.  I based the model’s assumptions on estimates provided by the owner of a 
large crab vessel of the historical relationship between his vessel’s total catch and costs of 
fuel, bait and groceries.  
 
Table V-2 summarizes the model’s assumptions.  Tables V-3 and V-4 (on the following 
























Bait (per fishing day) $650 L
Groceries (per day) $200 M
Repair & Maintenance (per 
operating day)
$1,000 N




Running 2 2 S
Transit 4 4 T






Fisheries landings tax rate 2.0% 2.0% AA
Buyback tax 1.9% 1.9% AB
Rationalization tax 1.5% AC
Arbitration fee per pound $0.01 AD
1.00 AE
70% AF
(varies) AGLeased quota, expressed as % of TAC
Vessel's fixed costs
Days











Summary of Crab Fishing Model Assumptions Used for Examples in This Chapter
Taxes
Royalty charge for leased quota
Ratio of vessel owner's quota share to 
owner's catch share without 
Total number of boats fishing for quota
Average boat catch/day for fleet
Vessel's catch per day (pounds)






Table V-3 shows the model’s calculations for the vessel without rationalization:  what its 
catch, gross revenues, and costs would have been, and what the resulting share payments 
to the crew and the vessel owner would have been.   
 
The model calculations are complicated.  I have included the formulas for the benefit of 
those readers who may wish to work through the details of the calculations, but most 
readers may wish to skip over these.  In brief, without rationalization, the vessel’s catch 
and its costs are driven by the number of days that the fishery is open.  The longer the 
fishery is open, the greater the vessel’s gross and net earnings, the greater the 
corresponding share payments to the crew and the vessel owner, and the greater the 
chance that the payment to the vessel owner will be sufficient to cover the owner’s fixed 




3,765,000 Q * R a
4.4 A / a b
Fishing 4.4 b c
Running 2.0 S d
Transit 4.0 T e
Port 9.0 U f
10.4 c + d + e g
19.4 c + d + e + f h
20,000 V i
87,629 V * c j
0.53% j / A k
$376,803 j * B l
3.9% AA + AB m
$14,695 m * l n
$27,403 C * [ D*c+E*d + F*e + G*f ] o
$2,848 L * c p
$331,857 l - (n + o + p) q
Total $136,061 X * q r
Captain $49,779 Y * q s
Crewman $19,911 Z * q t
Total grocery costs $3,876 M * h u
Grocery costs per crew $485 u / W v
Total $132,185 r - v w
Captain $49,294 s - v x
Crewman $19,427 t - v y
$195,796 q - w z
Repair & maintenance $10,381 N * g aa
Other $3,114 O * g ab
Fixed costs $300,000 P ac
Total $313,496 aa + ab + ac ad
-$117,700 z - ad ae
Total fleet catch per day (pounds)
Fleet fishing days
Vessel's catch per day (pounds)
Days
Operating days (Fishing, Running, & Transit)
Total days (Fishing, Running, Transit & 
Port)
Vessel's total catch (pounds)






Vessel's net earnings after taxes, fuel and bait 
costs










*Lower case letters refer to rows in the "calculations" tables; UPPER CASE letters refer to rows in the 
assumptions table.  
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Table V-4 shows the model’s calculations for the vessel with rationalization, assuming 
that the vessel leases quota equal to 0.5% of the TAC.  In brief, with rationalization, the 
vessel’s catch and its costs are driven by the amount of quota that it fishes, and how much 
of that quota is leased.  The more quota the vessel fishes, the greater the vessel’s gross 
and net earnings, and the greater the corresponding share payments to the crew and the 









Owner quota 87,629 af * A ah
Leased quota 82,481 ag * A ai
Total 170,109 ah + ai j
20,000 V i
Fishing 8.5 j / V c
Running 2.0 S d
Transit 4.0 T e
Port 9.0 U f
14.5 c + d + e g
23.5 c + d + e + f h
$731,469 j * B l
5.4% AA + AB + AC m
$0.01 AD aj
$41,200 m * l + aj * j n
$248,266 ai * B * (1 - m) - ai * aj ak
$34,463 C * [ D*c+E*d + F*e + G*f ] o
$5,529 L * c p
$402,011 l - ( n + o + p + ak ) q
Total $164,824 X * q r
Captain $60,302 Y * q s
Crewman $24,121 Z * q t
Total grocery costs $4,701 M * h u
Grocery costs per 
crew
$588 u / W v
Total $160,123 r - v w
Captain $59,714 s - v x
Crewman $23,533 t - v y
$237,186 q - w z
Repair & $14,505 N * g aa
Other $4,352 O * g ab
Fixed costs $300,000 P ac
Total $318,857 aa + ab + ac ad
-$81,671 z - ad ae
Crab Fishing Model Calculations for the Vessel With Rationalization,
Assuming the Vessel Leases Quota Equal to 0.5% of the TAC
Variable
Owner quota (share of TAC)
Vessel's gross revenue
Leased quota (share of TAC)
Days
Operating days (Fishing, Running, & 
Transit)
Total days (Fishing, Running, Transit & 
Port)
Pounds harvested
Vessel's catch per day (pounds)
Total tax rate




Arbitration fee per pound









*Lower case letters refer to rows in the "calculations" tables; UPPER CASE letters refer to rows in the 
assumptions table.  
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The vessel catches, revenues, costs and payments calculated by the crab fishing model 
are not necessarily representative for vessels in the BSAI crab fisheries.  They are more 
likely to be representative for large vessels.  However, the general nature of the effects of 
rationalization on payments illustrated by the model is likely to be similar for vessels of 
all sizes.    
 
Figure V-5 shows the model calculations for how the vessel’s revenues and payments 
change as it leases progressively greater amounts of quota.  Note that the model assumes 
that the vessel owner’s own quota is equal to what he would have caught in a derby 
fishery before rationalization.  Although this is probably not the case for most vessel 
owners, it allows the model to focus specifically on the effects of quota leasing.  The 
model also assumes that the vessel owner pays crew in the same way as before 
rationalization for fishing his own quota. (This was not necessarily the case for all boats). 
 
If the vessel doesn’t lease any quota, its costs and payments are almost the same as in the 
non-rationalized (“derby”) fishery.  The only difference is that its taxes are higher, 
because of the new rationalization tax (1.5% of ex-vessel value) and the arbitration fee of 
$0.01/lb.   
 
The more quota share the vessel leases--expressed as a share of the TAC—the more crab 
it catches and the higher its total revenues.  Quota royalties increase because 70% of the 
revenues from leased quota go to pay for royalties.  Payments to crew and the vessel 
owner also increase, but by much smaller amounts. 
 
Figure V-5 
Distribution of Total Vessel Revenues for Different Levels of Quota Leasing:






















                   Quota Share Leased by the Vessel, Expressed as % of TAC
Quota royalties





Quota lease rate = 70%









Figure V-6 shows how the percentage shares of different kinds of payments in the 
vessel’s total revenue change as the volume of quota leased increases.  As the vessel 
leases more quota, the share of quota royalties in total revenues increases, and the shares 
of payments to crew and payments to vessel owners decline.  If the vessel leases no quota, 
the total crew share is 34% of ex-vessel value.  If the vessel leases quota equal to 1% of 
the TAC, the total crew share falls to 18% of ex-vessel value.    
 
Figure V-6 
Percentage Distribution of Total Vessel Revenues for Different Levels of Quota Leasing:






















                   Quota Share Leased by the Vessel, Expressed as % of TAC
Quota royalties





Quota lease rate = 70%
Crew share of net value = 41%
 
 
Figures V-7 through V-12 (on the following two pages) illustrate other projections of the 







As a vessel leases and 
fishes more quota, a 
crewman’s total earnings 











As the vessel leases and 
fishes more quota, the 
total days worked by a 







Under the assumptions of 
this model, as a vessel 
leases and fishes more 
quota, a crewman’s 
earnings increase by 
about the same relative 
amount as the number of 
days worked—so that his 
earnings per day worked 
remain about the same 
(Figure V-9).  If we made 
different assumptions 
about the number of days 
spent working in port and 
in transit, earnings per 
day worked could 
increase or decrease. 
 
 Figure V-7 
Total Earnings of a Crewman who Receives a 6% Net Share




















Quota Share Leased (percentage of TAC)
Key Assumptions:
Quota lease rate = 70%
Crew share of net value = 41%
 
Figure V-8 
Number of Days a Crewman Works




















Quota Share Leased (percentage of TAC)
Key Assumptions:
Quota lease rate = 70%
Crew share of net value = 41%
 
Figure V-9 
Earnings per Day Worked of a Crewman who Receives a 6% Net Share


















Quota Share Leased (percentage of TAC)
Key Assumptions:
Quota lease rate = 70%




If all boats which fished 
owned and leased identical 
amounts of quota, then the 
more each individual boat 
leases, the smaller the fleet 
and the fewer the total jobs 
in the fishery (Figure V-10).  
The number of boats and 
jobs projected by the model 
would be roughly similar to 
what occurred in the 
2005/05 fishery at an 
average quota lease share 
between 0.5% and 1.0% of 
TAC. 
 
If all boats which fished 
owned and leased identical 
amounts of quota, then the 
more each individual boat 
leases, the greater the share 
of the total quota which 
would be leased, the smaller 
the share of total value of 
the fishery which would be 
paid to crew, and the 
smaller total crew earnings 
(Figure V-11) 
 
As the vessel owner leases 
more quota, the payments to 
the vessel owner (net of 
royalties, taxes, fuel and 
bait and grocery costs, and 
payments to crew) increase 
at a faster rate than the 
vessel owner’s costs.  As a 
result, the vessel owner’s 
profits increase (Figure V-
12).  In this example the 
vessel owner loses money if 
he doesn’t lease quota.  It is 
only by leasing at least 
some quota that he is able 
to make a profit.  Note that 
the estimated profit is 
highly sensitive to what we 
assume about the vessel 
owner’s fixed costs.  
 Figure V-10 
 
Number of Boats and Jobs if All Boats Lease Identical Quota Shares

































Quota lease rate = 70%




Total Crew Earnings for Fishery if All Boats Lease Identical Quota Shares 


















Quota Share Leased (percentage of TAC)
Key Assumptions:
Quota lease rate = 70%
Crew share of net value = 41%
 
Figure V-12 
Vessel Owner's Earnings, Costs and Profit for Different Levels of Quota Leasing




























Note:  Vessel owner's costs and 
profits are highly sensitive to what




As noted above (discussion of Figure V-10) the total number of boats and jobs projected 
by the crab fishing model would be roughly similar to the actual total number of boats 
and jobs in the 2005/06 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery at an average quota lease 
share between 0.5% and 1.0% of TAC.  We may use the crab fishing model’s projections 
of the distribution of revenue in the fishery for these two average quota lease shares to 
derive a rough estimate of how rationalization may have affected total payments to 
captains and crew in the 2005/06 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery. 
 
Table V-5 shows the model’s projections for the percentage distribution of ex-vessel 
value for these two average quota lease shares, and the corresponding projected payments 
from the 2005/06 Bristol Bay Red King Crab fishery ex-vessel value of $70.9 million.  At 
an average quota lease share of 0.5% of TAC, total payments to captains and crew would 
have declined from $24.9 million (without rationalization) to $15.5 million (with 
rationalization).  At an average quota lease share of 1.0% of TAC, total payments to 
captains and crew would have declined from $24.9 million (without rationalization) to 















Total Ex-Vessel Value 100.0% 100.0% 70.9 70.9 0.0 0%
Taxes & fees 3.9% 5.6% 2.8 4.0 1.2 44%
Quota Share Holders 33.9% 24.1 24.1
Costs (Fuel, Bait & Groc.) 9.1% 6.1% 6.4 4.3 -2.1 -33%
Vessel Owners 52.0% 32.4% 36.9 23.0 -13.9 -38%
Captains and Crew 35.1% 21.9% 24.9 15.5 -9.4 -38%
Total Ex-Vessel Value 100.0% 100.0% 70.9 70.9 0.0 0%
Taxes & fees 3.9% 5.6% 2.8 4.0 1.2 44%
Quota Share Holders 45.7% 32.4 32.4
Costs (Fuel, Bait & Groc.) 9.1% 5.1% 6.4 3.6 -2.8 -44%
Vessel Owners 52.0% 26.0% 36.9 18.4 -18.4 -50%
Captains and Crew 35.1% 17.6% 24.9 12.5 -12.4 -50%
Payment to
Payments ($ millions)
% change in 
payments
Model Projections of the Distribution of Bristol Bay Red King Crab Revenues With and Without Rationalization,
Under Alternative Assumptions About the Average Quota Lease per Vessel










1.0% of TAC  
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Table V-6 shows projected payments to Kodiak and non-Kodiak residents, assuming that 
payments were distributed in proportion to the number of jobs.  At an average quota lease 
share of 0.5% of TAC, total payments to Kodiak captains and crew would have declined 
from $3.9 million (without rationalization) to $2.8 million (with rationalization)—a 
decline in total Kodiak crab fishing earnings of about $1.0 million. At an average quota 
lease share of 1.0% of TAC, total payments to captains and crew would have declined 
from $3.9 million (without rationalization) to $2.3 million (with rationalization)—a 




Kodiak Residents 215 89 -125
Non-Kodiak Residents 1166 400 -766
Total 1381 490 -891
Kodiak Residents 3.9 2.8 -1.0
Non-Kodiak Residents 21.0 12.7 -8.3
Total 24.9 15.5 -9.4
Kodiak Residents 3.9 2.3 -1.6
Non-Kodiak Residents 21.0 10.2 -10.8
Total 24.9 12.5 -12.4
Note:  Estimates are based on crab fishing model assumptions and should be considered only 
approximate.
Assumed average 
quota lease share of 
1.0% of TAC
Total payments 
to captains and 
crew ($ millions)
Assumed average 
quota lease share of 
0.5% of TAC
Estimated number of jobs
(from Table V-1)
Estimated Effects of Rationalization on Earnings of Captains and Crew in the Bristol Bay Red 
King Crab Fishery, Under Different Assumptions About Average Quota Lease Share
 
 
These estimates suggest an approximate range for the effects of crab rationalization on 
crab fishing earnings of Kodiak residents in the 2005/06 Bristol Bay Red King Crab 
fishery.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the total number of hours worked 
by Kodiak residents in this fishery probably stayed about the same, with a smaller 
number of fishermen working longer seasons.  However, because the share of vessel 
earnings paid to fishermen declined, rationalization may have reduced the total earnings 
of Kodiak residents working in the fishery by between $1.0 million and $1.6 million. 
 
As I discussed at the beginning of this report, the 2005/06 crab fishing season is not 
necessarily representative of how the BSAI crab fisheries may change over time with 
rationalization.  Over time, it is likely that quota lease rates, the extent of quota leasing, 
and how crab fishermen are paid will change.15   
 
Economic theory suggests that what crab fishing crews are paid is driven by labor market 
forces of supply and demand.  For a given set of working conditions, the payment for a 
crab fishing season will tend towards the level at which the number of fishermen vessels 
owners want to hire (demand) is equal to the number of fishermen willing to work 
(supply).  The dramatic consolidation of the crab fishing fleet in the first year of 
rationalization greatly reduced the demand for crab fishermen without any corresponding 
reduction in supply.  Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the total payment to 
                                                 
15 A number of vessel owners have told me that the 70% royalty share paid to lease Bristol Bay Red King 
Crab quota this year was too high to be profitable, and that they expect the royalty share to be lower in the 
future.  
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crab fishermen for a similar amount of total crab fishing work would decline.  With 
hundreds of crab fishermen out of crab fishing jobs, it is not surprising that vessel owners 
would be able to find crew willing to work for lower average earnings (per day worked or 
crab pot pulled) than in earlier seasons. 
 
But this situation is not necessarily permanent.  As former crab fishermen find other jobs, 
fewer will be looking for crab jobs, and this may put upward pressure on average crew 
shares or daily earnings. 
 
Crab fishing has become a different kind of job than it was prior to rationalization.  With 
vessels fishing for known quota volumes, crew can be more certain about how much 
money they will earn for a season than they could before rationalization.  Economic 
theory suggests that with lower financial risk, people may be willing to work for lower 
total pay if there is less financial risk about how much they will be paid. 
 
With vessels fishing for known quota volumes, it is less important to catch crab fast.  
That may tend to reduce what vessel owners are willing to pay for highly skilled crab 
fishermen.   
 
Crab fishing seasons are longer—meaning that crew can earn more total income, but also 
have to give up more alternative work opportunities to go crab fishing. Over time, all of 
these factors and others may affect what crab fishermen are paid for what have become 
fewer and different jobs than they were prior to rationalization.   
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VI.   EFFECTS OF RATIONALIZATION ON KODIAK BUSINESSES 
 
Kodiak is a fishing community.  Many Kodiak businesses provide a wide variety of 
supplies and services to fishing vessels.  Many Kodiak residents are fishermen.  Thus a 
major change to the fishing industry has the potential to significantly affect Kodiak 
businesses by affecting purchases by fishing vessels and fishermen. 
 
As shown in Table VI-1, we would expect crab rationalization to affect different kinds of 
businesses in different ways.  Those most likely to be affected are those that derive a 
large share of their business from sales to crab boats and crab fishermen, and for which 





of effect Type of Business Examples
What the Effects of Rationalization
Depend on
Businesses which sell to fishing 
boats, and for which sales 
depend on the number of boats 
fishing
Pot storage and loading 
Welding
Marine supplies
Change in number of crab boats fishing
Crab boats as % of total sales




Change in number of crab fishermen working
Crab fishermen as % of total sales
Somewhat 
affected





Change in crab fishing income
Crab fishing % of total resident income
Businesses which sell to fishing 
boats, and for which sales 




Change in  total crab fishing days
Crab boats as % of total sales
Businesses which don't sell to 





How Different Types of Businesses Might Be Affected by Crab Rationalization
 
 
Businesses which store crab pots are directly affected by how many pots are fished.  The 




Some crab fleet purchases—such as fuel, bait and groceries—depend more on the total 
days spent fishing than on the number of boats fishing or fishermen working.  For 
example, if one-third as many fishermen work for three times as many days, they will 
still need about the same amount of groceries.  However, rationalization may have caused 
some of these sales to shift from Kodiak communities closer to the fishing grounds, such 
as Dutch Harbor, to the extent that boats buy more fuel, bait and groceries when they 
deliver crab, rather than buying supplies for their entire season in Kodiak. 
 
A number of Kodiak business owners have told me about specific ways in which their 
sales were harmed by crab rationalization.  Below are examples:  
 
“I own a life raft inspection station, so I sell and service life rafts, EPIRBS 
and other marine safety equipment.  Of course I do business with most all 
the fisheries.  The mainstay of my business is life raft servicing, so if a 
boat doesn't go fishing I don't get to service their raft/s.  Additionally, 
depending on the way the boat operates the crew sometimes buy safety 
gear for themselves if the boat doesn't (i.e., survival suit personal lights or 
personal EPIRBS).  I can't nail down specific numbers as far as 
percentages of loss until last year taxes are filed . . . However, when 
halibut was turned into an IFQ based fishery I lost over 30% of my 
business due to high attrition in the fishing fleet.  While I hope the crab 
impact is not so severe it will still loom large.” 
 
“We own a boat yard in Kodiak.  Previous to this year we had 5 boats that 
came up to store in the yard for a couple of months before crab season 
until a month after the season because their owners or operators also 
fished other fisheries with those boats and ran a crabber for the crab 
season.  This year we had none. . . There is no other reason for boats to 
come out of the water and store at that time of year.  What did not occur as 
it has in the past 23 years is the cross-over owners with smaller boats that 
also fish crab did not fish this year because of Crab Ratz, so there was no 
need to store the smaller boat out of the water.” 
 
“We have several rental units . . .  One of renters was a crab fisherman and 
he moved back to Seattle as his skipper told him in September that the 
boat would no longer fish and he no longer had a job as skipper.  So I was 
out a renter at $950 per month for the last 5 months for a total of $4750.” 
 
“I spoke with [operator of a bunkhouse] this morning and he told me that 
he usually had the same 3 or 4 guys rent from him each year for a couple 
of months before crab when they mended pots and got gear on board the 
boats and then again when they cleaned gear and stacked pots for a month.  
This year none of them showed up or called.  Four guys at $300 each per 
month for 3 months equals $3600 for those rooms.” 
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Accounts like these suggest that the effects of crab rationalization are real and important 
for some Kodiak businesses.  However, they don’t provide a basis for estimating how 
significant the total effects may be. 
 






One indicator of the potential general magnitude of the change in vessel expenditures due 
to rationalization is this list, provided to me by a Kodiak crab vessel owner, of separate 
purchases made from Kodiak businesses in preparing the vessel for the 2005 Bristol Bay 
King Crab season: 
 
Alaska Hydraulics $          925.91 
Alaska Hydraulics $            20.24 
Arc & Spark Welding $       1,406.85 
Breakwater Plumbing $            69.61 
Crescent Electric $          505.88 
Crescent Electric $          386.37 
Island Hydraulics $       3,726.82 
NAPA Parts Supply $          170.32 
Kodiak Marine Supply $       2,909.01 
Kodiak Metals $          767.00 
Kodiak Service $          547.69 
Radar Alaska $          100.70 
AIMS (Industrial Marine) $          143.06 
Sutliff’s True Value Hardware $       3,067.24 
Nets Pacific $       1,776.71 
Petro Marine $          374.37 
Total Supplies & Related $     16,897.78  
 
Extrapolating very roughly, if every vessel had spent this amount, then the 54 “Kodiak 
Boats” which fished the Bristol Bay Red King season in 2004/05 would have spent 
$912,000, and the 23 “Kodiak Boats which fished the Bristol Bay Red King Crab season 
in 2005/06 would have spent $389,000.  The decline (not all of which would be 
attributable to rationalization) would be about $523,000, or about half a million dollars.  
Note that this estimate does not include expenditures made by fishing crew (as opposed 
to the vessel). 
 
As another potential indicator of the effects of crab rationalization on Kodiak businesses, 
I looked at business sales data collected by the City of Kodiak each quarter for the 
purpose of calculating sales tax obligations.  The sales data are confidential for individual 
businesses, but the City can release combined data for a group of businesses.   
 
I asked the City to calculate total sales by quarter for twelve Kodiak businesses that 
supply or service the crab fleet, shown in Table VI-2 on the following page.  These 
twelve companies are not (by any means!) the only businesses that supply or service the 
crab fleet, or necessarily the largest.  However, they were regularly mentioned by crab 
vessel owners that I talked to, and their sales may be representative of trends for these 




Twelve Kodiak Marine Supply and Service Businesses 
Alaska Hydraulics, Inc 
Alaska Industrial and Marine Services 
Arc N Spark Welding 
Island Hydraulics 
Kodiak Marine Supply 
Kodiak Metals & Supply Inc 
Kodiak Ocean Safety Services 
Kodiak Service Company 
Kodiak Welding & Supply 
Nets Pacific 
Radar-Alaska Marine Electronic 
Sutliff's Hardware Inc 
 
Table VI-3 shows combined quarterly sales data for these twelve businesses.  We would 
expect to see effects of crab rationalization in sales for the fourth quarter (October-
December) of 2005 and the first quarter (January-March) of 2006, compared with 
previous-year sales for the same quarters.   Total sales for these twelve businesses 
increased by 14% in the fourth quarter of 2005 and by 10% in the first quarter of 2006.   
 
Table VI-3 
2004 2005 2006 2005 2006
1st quarter 2,367 2,657 2,951 11% 10%
2nd quarter 3,004 3,650 NA 18% NA
3rd quarter 2,590 3,086 NA 16% NA
4th quarter 2,128 2,480 NA 14% NA
Source:  City of Kodiak, Sales Tax Office
Total Sales of Twelve Kodiak Marine Supply and Services Businesses ($000)
Year
Quarter
% change from previous year
 
 
Sales trends are not the same for all of these businesses.  According to the city sales tax 
technician, compared with the previous year, during the fourth quarter of 2005, sales 
were down for three businesses, and one business reported a big decrease in sales.  
During the first quarter of 2006, sales were down for four businesses, and two businesses 
reported a big decrease in sales.   
Table VI-4 
Change Fourth Quarter 2005 First Quarter 2006
Decrease 3 4
Big decrease 1 2
Increase 9 7
Big increase "several" 6
Change in Sales Compared with the Previous Year
for Twelve Kodiak Marine Supply and Service Companies
Source:  City of Kodiak Sales Tax Technician, personal communication.  One 
company's sales presumably remained about the same in the first quarter of 2006.  
 
In contrast, the majority of these businesses are doing well.  During the fourth quarter of 
2005, sales were up for nine businesses, and “several” business reported a big increase in 
sales.  During the first quarter of 2006, sales were up for seven businesses and six 
businesses reported a big increase in sales. 
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From this limited evidence, it is difficult to find any clear evidence of any major effect of 
crab rationalization on Kodiak marine supply and service businesses in general. Some 
marine supply and service businesses have experienced declining sales since 
rationalization began.  However, as a group these twelve businesses have not experienced 
any dramatic or obvious decline in sales, and the majority have experienced growth in 
sales.  This does not, of course, mean that they weren’t affected by rationalization or 
didn’t experience a loss in sales to the crab fleet and crab fishermen.  It does suggest 
that—for most of these particular businesses—the effects of crab rationalization have 
been outweighed by other factors affecting their sales. 
 
Tables VI-5, VI-6 and VI-7 (on the following three pages) are based on total reported 
quarterly sales of Kodiak businesses since 2002 for the 27 “business types” for which the 
City regularly compiles quarterly sales information.  Table VI-5 shows total reported sale.  
Table VI-6 shows the percentage change in sales compared to the corresponding quarter 
of the previous year.  Table VI-7 compares the average of fourth-and-first-quarter sales 
for 2004/05 and 2005/06. 
 
These data also do not provide any conclusive evidence about the effects of crab 
rationalization on Kodiak businesses.  Sales for some business types were down in the 
fourth quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, while sales for other business types 
were up.  There is no obvious relationship between rationalization and the types of 
businesses for which sales were up or down.  For several of the business types for which 
sales were down, including taxi cabs, communications, rentals/leases, personal services, 
business services, health services and legal services, sales had been declining before the 
fourth quarter of 2005--suggesting that other factors were driving the decline. 
 
The business type which experienced the largest absolute reported decline for the 
combined fourth and first quarters was “contractors.”  However, according to the City 
sales tax technician, these data may not be reliable since contractors as a group tend to 





2002 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
Contractors 2,792 5,597 13,302 7,209 5,700 13,546 16,255 9,976 4,775 8,866 13,521 12,581 7,349 9,879 13,132 9,077 6,233
Grocery Stores 7,227 8,062 8,177 7,220 7,756 8,044 8,335 7,933 7,483 8,109 8,466 7,342 7,770 8,656 8,844 7,793 7,903
Canneries 2,286 4,789 4,354 3,648 3,125 5,421 5,705 3,029 3,356 4,535 6,585 2,579 3,225 5,676 5,862 3,263 3,092
Taxi Cabs 176 189 200 184 155 158 201 161 182 196 200 183 175 164 191 161 150
City Boat Harbor  525 371 585 312 618 329 744 296 570 119 854 159 273 148 700 563 503
Boat Charters 60 101 429 170 49 66 643 82 88 268 869 238 37 260 904 318 111
Communications 1,025 1,236 1,131 1,168 1,037 1,129 1,060 1,158 1,121 1,330 1,435 1,466 1,294 1,230 1,193 1,312 1,578
City Utilities    1,250 1,172 1,131 1,121 1,218 1,161 1,302 1,176 1,234 1,091 1,228 1,041 1,210 1,110 1,281 1,083 NA
Utilities 5,361 4,983 5,381 5,284 5,697 4,993 5,380 5,001 5,724 5,112 5,843 5,012 5,975 5,206 5,922 5,507 6,402
Beverage Distributors 213 377 481 362 296 416 492 410 360 471 453 294 352 509 546 462 647
Retail Sales 22,491 32,664 28,223 25,717 23,751 35,135 28,864 26,620 25,243 32,475 35,311 32,343 32,122 33,281 45,885 31,584 29,464
Restaurants 1,482 1,851 1,930 1,753 1,584 1,864 2,094 1,864 1,715 1,985 2,134 1,890 1,675 1,955 2,276 1,749 1,635
Bars/Liquor Stores 1,824 2,209 2,475 2,313 1,411 2,499 2,717 2,386 2,126 2,465 2,767 2,385 2,181 2,465 2,864 2,352 2,183
Rentals/Leases 2,321 2,346 2,390 2,428 2,312 2,360 2,549 2,350 2,416 2,489 2,546 2,431 2,488 2,421 2,370 2,239 2,488
Hotels/Motels/B&B 478 918 1,375 756 683 1,068 1,512 831 812 1,025 1,484 858 788 1,138 1,651 966 1,017
Beauticians 166 184 184 208 173 208 201 188 185 192 188 202 183 195 199 213 196
Personal Services 123 140 159 155 167 183 200 185 225 232 220 211 200 182 189 178 198
Advertising 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 3 0 0 32 0
Artists/Photographers 18 53 16 89 17 57 64 49 19 53 75 88 38 82 101 89 49
Business Services 962 979 1,031 1,037 928 1,022 1,109 1,057 1,053 1,213 1,323 1,210 1,148 981 991 1,071 1,242
Vehicle Repairs 917 1,365 1,252 1,109 851 1,152 1,292 1,153 1,299 1,244 1,389 1,166 819 1,229 1,059 1,073 843
Service Stations 706 828 773 712 736 841 840 822 796 913 976 891 832 1,014 1,067 990 1,547
General Repair Services 1,333 1,617 1,836 1,863 1,743 1,767 1,722 1,461 1,411 1,850 1,798 1,599 1,560 1,724 1,607 1,689 1,728
Amusements 150 144 172 121 125 132 158 88 278 277 295 272 271 274 259 261 243
Health Services 114 104 113 100 37 126 83 84 122 103 110 106 88 126 101 68 51
Legal Services 287 236 353 267 231 284 325 243 275 287 532 495 325 427 182 294 385
Miscellaneous Services 669 1,040 1,494 1,234 707 1,686 1,662 1,298 1,232 1,831 1,726 1,470 1,475 2,087 2,022 1,495 1,709
Total 54,956 73,556 78,947 66,541 61,107 85,646 85,510 69,902 64,098 78,729 92,328 78,523 73,857 82,418 101,398 75,882 NA
Total, excl. City Utilities 53,707 72,384 77,816 65,421 59,889 84,484 84,208 68,726 62,864 77,638 91,101 77,482 72,647 81,308 100,117 74,798 71,596
Source:  City of Kodiak, Sales Tax Office.
Business Type








2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
Contractors 104% 142% 22% 38% -16% -35% -17% 26% 54% 11% -3% -28% -15%
Grocery Stores 7% 0% 2% 10% -4% 1% 2% -7% 4% 7% 4% 6% 2%
Canneries 37% 13% 31% -17% 7% -16% 15% -15% -4% 25% -11% 27% -4%
Taxi Cabs -12% -17% 0% -12% 18% 24% 0% 13% -4% -16% -4% -12% -14%
City Boat Harbor  18% -11% 27% -5% -8% -64% 15% -46% -52% 25% -18% 253% 84%
Boat Charters -18% -35% 50% -51% 80% 309% 35% 189% -57% -3% 4% 34% 197%
Communications 1% -9% -6% -1% 8% 18% 35% 27% 15% -8% -17% -10% 22%
City Utilities    -3% -1% 15% 5% 1% -6% -6% -11% -2% 2% 4% 4% NA
Utilities 6% 0% 0% -5% 0% 2% 9% 0% 4% 2% 1% 10% 7%
Beverage Distributors 39% 10% 2% 13% 22% 13% -8% -28% -2% 8% 21% 57% 84%
Retail Sales 6% 8% 2% 4% 6% -8% 22% 21% 27% 2% 30% -2% -8%
Restaurants 7% 1% 8% 6% 8% 6% 2% 1% -2% -2% 7% -7% -2%
Bars/Liquor Stores -23% 13% 10% 3% 51% -1% 2% 0% 3% 0% 4% -1% 0%
Rentals/Leases 0% 1% 7% -3% 5% 5% 0% 3% 3% -3% -7% -8% 0%
Hotels/Motels/B&B 43% 16% 10% 10% 19% -4% -2% 3% -3% 11% 11% 13% 29%
Beauticians 4% 13% 10% -10% 7% -8% -6% 8% -1% 2% 5% 5% 7%
Personal Services 36% 31% 26% 19% 34% 26% 10% 14% -11% -21% -14% -16% -1%
Advertising 187%
Artists/Photographers -7% 8% 293% -45% 8% -7% 17% 81% 105% 54% 35% 1% 28%
Business Services -4% 4% 8% 2% 14% 19% 19% 15% 9% -19% -25% -11% 8%
Vehicle Repairs -7% -16% 3% 4% 53% 8% 8% 1% -37% -1% -24% -8% 3%
Service Stations 4% 2% 9% 15% 8% 9% 16% 9% 5% 11% 9% 11% 86%
General Repair Services 31% 9% -6% -22% -19% 5% 4% 9% 11% -7% -11% 6% 11%
Amusements -16% -9% -8% -27% 121% 110% 87% 209% -2% -1% -12% -4% -10%
Health Services -68% 21% -26% -16% 232% -18% 33% 26% -28% 22% -8% -36% -42%
Legal Services -20% 21% -8% -9% 19% 1% 64% 104% 18% 49% -66% -41% 19%
Miscellaneous Services 6% 62% 11% 5% 74% 9% 4% 13% 20% 14% 17% 2% 16%
Total 11% 16% 8% 5% 5% -8% 8% 12% 15% 5% 10% -3% NA
Total, excl. City Utilities 12% 17% 8% 5% 5% -8% 8% 13% 16% 5% 10% -3% -1%
Source:  City of Kodiak, Sales Tax Office.








The only business types for which sales declined in the fourth and first quarters of 
2005/06 but not for the third quarter of 2005 were retail sales, restaurants, and bars/liquor 
stores.  The decline in retail sales of 5% is important because it represent by far the 
largest component of total sales.  We may speculate that the decline for these three 
sectors may have been due to reduced spending by crab boats which didn’t fish and crab 
fishermen who lost jobs and income.  But without a much more detailed examination of 
the Kodiak economy and all the other factors which may have affected sales, we can’t 




Contractors 9,965 7,655 -4,620 -23%
Retail Sales 32,232 30,524 -3,417 -5%
Rentals/Leases 2,459 2,364 -192 -4%
Restaurants 1,782 1,692 -180 -5%
Legal Services 410 339 -141 -17%
Health Services 97 60 -75 -38%
Vehicle Repairs 993 958 -69 -3%
Taxi Cabs 179 156 -46 -13%
Business Services 1,179 1,156 -46 -2%
Amusements 272 252 -39 -7%
Personal Services 205 188 -35 -9%
Bars/Liquor Stores 2,283 2,268 -30 -1%
Artists/Photographers 63 69 11 9%
Advertising 7 16 18 124%
Beauticians 193 204 24 6%
Communications 1,380 1,445 131 5%
Boat Charters 138 214 153 56%
General Repair Services 1,580 1,708 258 8%
Miscellaneous Services 1,473 1,602 259 9%
Hotels/Motels/B&B 823 992 338 21%
Beverage Distributors 323 554 463 72%
Canneries 2,902 3,177 550 9%
Grocery Stores 7,556 7,848 584 4%
City Boat Harbor  216 533 633 146%
Service Stations 862 1,268 813 47%
Utilities 5,494 5,954 921 8%
City Utilities    1,126 NA NA NA
Total 76,190 NA NA NA
Total, excl. City Utilities 76,011 73,658 -4,706 -3%
Comparison of Average Fourth and First Quarter Sales, 2004/05 & 2005/06
Source:  City of Kodiak, Sales Tax Office.  * Business types for which sales declined 
in the fourth and first quarters of 2005/06 but not for the third quarter of 2005 are 
shown in bold.
% Change*




More generally, Kodiak has a relatively large and diversified economy that is based on  
many different fisheries, a large fish processing industry, a large Coast Guard base, a 
rocket launch facility, and state spending (including Permanent Fund dividends).  This 
diversity tends to reduce the relative economic impact of changes in any one fishery, and 
makes it difficult to measure these impacts using aggregate economic data such as City 
sales data.   
 
